Uncle Jim
Uncle Jim was a tall lanky Scotsman, a quiet unassuming chap. He had married my Mothers younger sister in 1946, aged just 26, and their only Daughter Sally was much the same age as me. We knew he had been a Sergeant in the Scots Guards and had served with the Long Range Desert Group in North Africa. The commendation hanging in their hallway was a testament to his bravery, and the slight limp when he walked a reminder he was shot in the leg.
Rumour was that he was wounded behind enemy lines, and had to stay quiet as he was carried out past enemy positions. As was the way, he never spoke of the war, and sadly we never asked.
He did once mention to me he was a guest of honour at the premier of ‘Sea of Sand’ in London, a 1958 film about the exploits of the
LRDG. Apparently just 17 of the surviving members of Bagnold’s desert commandos were traced, dressed in their Arabian ‘uniform’,and ferried to the Theatre in Willy’s Jeeps. His only comment on the film was that they had good vehicles – he said in reality the LRDG had a hotchpotch of different vehicles begged, borrowed or stolen from wherever, including the Italians and Germans!
A gentle, quietly spoken person with a good sense of humour, he just got on with a very ordinary life of working during the week and fishing at weekends. His wartime exploits had earned him the respect of his peers, he had done more than his bit and we
were all quite proud, and that was enough.
He died in 2003, and the local Vicar was a frequent visitor during the last weeks before his death. He had obviously chatted at some length with Jim, and gathered much information, which he recounted during his address to those gathered at Jim’s funeral.
It was no surprise he mentioned Jim's service with the LRDG, but there was more. We had all assumed he had been invalided out of the war, but in fact he had returned to London, and ‘spent some time on bomb disposal duty’. Following this he was assigned to guarding Buckingham Palace. Then as a finale, after the war he was recruited into the newly reformed SAS.
It seems he had ‘forgot to mention’ these later exploits.
His daughter Sally was as amazed as anyone.
Oh, and along the way he was awarded the Military Medal. He had ‘forgot to mention’ that as well.
The citation reads:
14/10/1943 James Wilson 318000 Scots Guards attd. LRDG
“Since Sgt Wilson joined the LRDG over two years ago he has not missed a single operation of his Patrol, and on every
occasion has displayed conspicuous courage and devotion to duty.
When wounded in action in Jan 1941, he suffered much pain with the utmost fortitude while being carried over 1000 miles over bumpy desert in a truck before reaching a dressing station.
He was a member of a small party which carried out a successful census of enemy traffic behind the lines in the JEBEL in March 1942.
This was carried out under the most arduous conditions, involving a walk of 60 miles carrying much kit, but Sgt Wilson’s personal example made the task seem easy to the men under him.
In July 1942 he displayed particular gallantry in attending to his wounded officer, remaining with him, exposed to heavy fire from enemy fighter aircraft.
Throughout his service with the LRDG, Sgt Wilson has been an admirable example to the men in his Patrol.”
Signed:
Guy Prendergast, Lt Col. Comdg. LRDG
Bernard L Montgomery,
Gen. Eighth Army
Note that having been shot in the leg in Jan 1941, not only did he just carry on as before, but 14 months later walked 60 miles across a desert. The wound was such that he could only walk with the aid of a stick in later life.
He was credited with having been the soldier transported the furthest in WW2 having been wounded in action and taken to the nearest dressing station.
Rumour was that he was wounded behind enemy lines, and had to stay quiet as he was carried out past enemy positions. As was the way, he never spoke of the war, and sadly we never asked.
He did once mention to me he was a guest of honour at the premier of ‘Sea of Sand’ in London, a 1958 film about the exploits of the
LRDG. Apparently just 17 of the surviving members of Bagnold’s desert commandos were traced, dressed in their Arabian ‘uniform’,and ferried to the Theatre in Willy’s Jeeps. His only comment on the film was that they had good vehicles – he said in reality the LRDG had a hotchpotch of different vehicles begged, borrowed or stolen from wherever, including the Italians and Germans!
A gentle, quietly spoken person with a good sense of humour, he just got on with a very ordinary life of working during the week and fishing at weekends. His wartime exploits had earned him the respect of his peers, he had done more than his bit and we
were all quite proud, and that was enough.
He died in 2003, and the local Vicar was a frequent visitor during the last weeks before his death. He had obviously chatted at some length with Jim, and gathered much information, which he recounted during his address to those gathered at Jim’s funeral.
It was no surprise he mentioned Jim's service with the LRDG, but there was more. We had all assumed he had been invalided out of the war, but in fact he had returned to London, and ‘spent some time on bomb disposal duty’. Following this he was assigned to guarding Buckingham Palace. Then as a finale, after the war he was recruited into the newly reformed SAS.
It seems he had ‘forgot to mention’ these later exploits.
His daughter Sally was as amazed as anyone.
Oh, and along the way he was awarded the Military Medal. He had ‘forgot to mention’ that as well.
The citation reads:
14/10/1943 James Wilson 318000 Scots Guards attd. LRDG
“Since Sgt Wilson joined the LRDG over two years ago he has not missed a single operation of his Patrol, and on every
occasion has displayed conspicuous courage and devotion to duty.
When wounded in action in Jan 1941, he suffered much pain with the utmost fortitude while being carried over 1000 miles over bumpy desert in a truck before reaching a dressing station.
He was a member of a small party which carried out a successful census of enemy traffic behind the lines in the JEBEL in March 1942.
This was carried out under the most arduous conditions, involving a walk of 60 miles carrying much kit, but Sgt Wilson’s personal example made the task seem easy to the men under him.
In July 1942 he displayed particular gallantry in attending to his wounded officer, remaining with him, exposed to heavy fire from enemy fighter aircraft.
Throughout his service with the LRDG, Sgt Wilson has been an admirable example to the men in his Patrol.”
Signed:
Guy Prendergast, Lt Col. Comdg. LRDG
Bernard L Montgomery,
Gen. Eighth Army
Note that having been shot in the leg in Jan 1941, not only did he just carry on as before, but 14 months later walked 60 miles across a desert. The wound was such that he could only walk with the aid of a stick in later life.
He was credited with having been the soldier transported the furthest in WW2 having been wounded in action and taken to the nearest dressing station.
Long Range Desert Group
Their theatre of war was the Libyan Desert, the size of India, 1200 by 1000 miles, containing the impassable Sand Sea, the size of Ireland.
The desert war ran from December 1940 to March 1943 and was the place the Germans and Italians were first defeated.
Patrols were designed with a 1500-mile capability & over 25 days supplies, although it was common to double this.
Despite being a secret clandestine group, its reputation was such that there was never any shortage of volunteers, just the difficulty of finding the right ones. At one point 12 recruits were taken from 700 volunteers and on another 20 were taken from 500 interviewed.
One recruit, arriving on Christmas Day, was found unsuitable, and at 7.30am on Boxing Day found to his dismay he was on his way back to his original unit.
Their prime directive was to gather intelligence about enemy movements hundreds of miles behind the front lines without their presence being known, but they were also involved in frequent attacks on enemy airfields and garrisons, appearing from nowhere and melting away afterwards. They often appeared to be a bigger force than they were, confusing the enemy as to a major offensive, and causing them to deploy valuable resources to guarding their long supply lines.
They numbered just 90 at the start, rising to around 350, including support staff. As they went about exploring uncharted deserts, they produced the first detailed maps, and latterly found routes to outflank Rommel and literally led the eighth army units through previously impassable terrain in pincer movements around German defences.
The LRDG were the first special forces unit, later followed by the SAS. The SAS were formed primarily as a fighting force, and after an initial logistically catastrophic raid, were teamed up with the LRDG. The LRDG were a self-sufficient unit with their own procurement, workshops, maps, navigation, radios, armament, planes and reported directly to the Commander in Chief Middle East. This provided the SAS with the resources they lacked, gave them transport, and let them concentrate on creating havoc hundreds of miles behind the enemy’s front lines. This was highly effective, although it conflicted with the LRDG low profile intelligence gathering, and eventually the SAS acquired their own transport and became a separate unit.
Whilst the Italians vastly outnumbered the British, they had no stomach for fighting. But they did have an Auto Saharan force, unlike the Germans, who were only capable of fighting in a regimental fashion and had no equivalent units.
The LRDG were not a formal unit in that they had little regimentation and virtually no army issue equipment. They had bought and converted their own trucks, begged borrowed and stole equipment including from the enemy, had their own support planes and heavy supply section, no formal uniform apart from the Scorpion badge on whatever clothing was appropriate to conditions, and no drills or inspections. They did however run their own vigorous training regime, especially in desert navigation by sun or stars. After weeks in the desert a returning unit would be greeted with much suspicion by other soldiers, unwashed and unshaven, they more resembled a band of motorised marauding Arabs than a British elite force.
Their vehicles were unmarked, enabling them to offer a friendly wave to enemy fighters who often mistook them for their own forces, the disadvantage being they were sometimes strafed by the RAF. Occasionally they would venture on to main roads, offering a salute to passing enemy vehicles, and with Italian or German speaking comrades even bluffing their way through enemy roadblocks.
My Uncle, James Wilson, Scots Guards attached to LRDG, Corporal, acting Sergeant, joined in 1940. His parent unit was 2 Battalion Scots Guards. Born 14/9/1919.
There follows some brief highlights in a timeline of desert exploits:
1938 The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards were stationed at Kasr-el-nil Barracks in Cairo. By the end of 1940 they had seen no action, and some were eager to represent their Regiment facing the enemy. The chance to join a fighting unit for some offered an opportunity not to be missed.
1940
July 10th LRDG formed, with Major Ralph A Bagnold as CO
Sept First Patrol of New Zealanders
T, R, & W Patrols, all New Zealanders
On one occasion, unable to get near enough to observe an Italian garrison by vehicle, Captain Pat Clayton put two Arabs and a camel in a lorry and drove them across the desert so they could carry out recognisance un-detected.
First encounter with Italian forces captured a convoy with 2500 gallons of petrol, official war mail, supplies, 7 prisoners and a goat, which surprised the Italians somewhat as they were 650 miles behind their front line.
Italian offensive of 250,000 troops halted amid confusion of attacks on their southern flank supply line by LRDG.
Nov Expanded to 6 patrols, each with 2 officers & 28 other ranks
Dec G Patrol formed from Coldstream & 2nd Battalion Scots Guards under Captain Pat Clayton / Major Crichton-Stuart, comprising 31 NCO’s and Guardsmen. Initially 18 were recruited from each regiment, all volunteers, into what was then an unknown secret unit. (It is interesting that they volunteered only knowing it was a fighting unit, nothing else - whereas in just a few months their exploits became legend and every fighting mans dream unit).
Boxing Day left for Murzuk Raid with 76 men of G & T Patrols plus 10 French and 23 vehicles. Murzuk was an Italian Fort with a garrison of 200 and an airdrome 1000 miles from Cairo but requiring a 1500-mile journey taking 18 days.
1941
David Stirling, Scots Guards, founded the Special Air Service.
Jan LRDG carried out Murzuk Raid on Jan 11th. Two were killed, three shot below the knee, and Guardsman Sgt Wilson incurred a severe leg wound. He was carried by truck to Zouar, via further missions at Treghen, Gatrun & Abd El Galil, arriving on the 20th, then flown to Fort Lany with Bagnold, then Khartoum, having travelled 3000 miles in 16 days to reach the General Hospital in Cairo. It was reported he ‘had survived the shocking journey from Murzuk with admirable fortitude’ and ‘made a good recovery’.
It transpired afterwards that a Frenchman had also been shot in the calf but had just cauterised it with his cigarette and carried on fighting, afterwards he ‘had not bothered’ to see the Doctor.
At Gebel Sherif on Jan 31st Clayton with T Patrol was attacked by 5 Italian cars and 3 aircraft. Clayton was wounded and captured.
Four men presumed killed when their truck exploded had survived and were unknowingly left behind. 1 was wounded in the foot, another in the throat, and only had 14 pints of water between them. They decided to walk back to base, some giving up on the way, but later found although one died. After 10 days the last one was found, Moore, still walking, having covered 210 miles, and was somewhat annoyed as he had wanted to finish the last 80 miles on his own.
Mar Added Y & S Patrols – Southern Rhodesians
Aug Guy Prendergast became CO
Sept Trial road watch on enemy coast road 400 miles behind the front line, but a 600-mile journey from the LRDG base.
Oct T1 Patrol captured two German trucks 50 miles outside of Benghazi, this time the Germans being surprised as they were 500 miles behind their front line at Sollum.
Nov Started road watch to Spring 1942.
S1 Patrol captured a lorry full of Italians, including by chance a Regia Aeronutica pilot who had previously attacked the LRDG. The Italians were, as always, surprised as they were 500 miles from the nearest British position.
Dec The SAS, deployed by the LRDG, were inflicting as much damage on the Luftwaffe as the RAF.
1942
Comprised 25 officers and 278 other ranks
Jan 9 men had their truck destroyed by Stukas, had to spend 8 days walking 200 miles over desert with little water to get to an oasis
Feb G Patrol split, Lieutenant Robin Gurdon commanded G2, Alastair Timpson G1
Mar G2 Jebel road watch carried out with Sgt Wilson, involving a trek of over 60 miles with heavy equipment.
Spring through to December carried out 24-hour Road Watches with 5.00am to 7.00pm day shifts of two soldiers hidden by the roadside.
Involved a week at a time 600 miles from their base.
May Lieutenant Robin Gurdon left Siwa with G2 headed to Benghazi with David Stirling.
On the 21st David Stirling with 5 others (including Randolph Churchill) spent 24 hours carrying out an attack on Benghazi using a British Ford Staff Car 200 miles behind the enemy front line, passing through an Italian roadblock twice.
G1 and T2 were tasked with blowing up enemy trucks on the coast road, without the enemy knowing how that was being done. It was decided to use time bombs thrown into passing trucks. The trouble was the enemy trucks were moving too fast, so they erected German road works to slow them down. This still proved impossible, so Timpson decided to drive a truck without lights behind an enemy vehicle, with Sergeant Fraser sat on the bonnet to lob a time bomb in the back. Unfortunately they came upon a broken down Italian lorry who asked them for a tow, thinking they must be Germans, before they could implement their plan. The impossible had become unbelievable!
July Gurdon and Stirling headed to attack an enemy base and airfield respectively.
Attacked by 3 Italian fighters on way to attack airfield between Fuka and Daba with SAS, Robin Gurdon fatally wounded, attended by his Patrol Sgt Wilson, remaining with him exposed to heavy fire from enemy fighter aircraft. Murrey his driver was severely wounded. The mission was aborted but Gurdon died the following day. Lieutenant Sweeting later took command of G2. Wilson was described as Gunner & Medical Orderly.
85 enemy aircraft destroyed by SAS & LRDG near Fuka & Baggush.
After T Patrol and the SAS attacked one airfield the Germans pursued and attacked the Patrol directed by an aircraft, the aircraft frequently landing to confer with the German troops. Two New Zealanders from T Patrol got fed up with this so followed the plane and next time it landed they shot it up and burnt it.
Sept Failed raid on Tobruk.
Eight German Heinkel’s attacked the LRDG base at Kufra, the LRDG & SAS armed with captured Italian Breda 20mm guns, shot five down.
1943
Italians and Germans in retreat.
February Hons was the new base for the LRDG. G1 and G2 patrols had been decimated in action and was reconstructed into a single G patrol. Three veterans from Murzuk remained, including sergeant Wilson, plus another 14 new recruits mostly Guards. G Patrol was now under Bruce and sent on a scouting patrol around Chott Djerid. This was the last LRDG patrol, covering 3500 miles in 37 days, and was not without incident.
After the patrol they went to Constantine and stopped in Biskra on their way. This was full of fresh American troops yet to see desert or battle. The LRDG were the Yanks first contact with the British 8th Army. Reported at the time as ‘Ay-rabs in Jeeps’, large bearded men in Arab headdress driving desert camouflaged vehicles bristling with guns - not something even encountered in Hollywood movies!
May North Africa under Allied control, Rommel defeated
1947 SAS reformed
Credits:
G Patrol, 1958, Michael Crichton-Stuart
Sergeant Kevin Gorman, Scots Guards Archive
The desert war ran from December 1940 to March 1943 and was the place the Germans and Italians were first defeated.
Patrols were designed with a 1500-mile capability & over 25 days supplies, although it was common to double this.
Despite being a secret clandestine group, its reputation was such that there was never any shortage of volunteers, just the difficulty of finding the right ones. At one point 12 recruits were taken from 700 volunteers and on another 20 were taken from 500 interviewed.
One recruit, arriving on Christmas Day, was found unsuitable, and at 7.30am on Boxing Day found to his dismay he was on his way back to his original unit.
Their prime directive was to gather intelligence about enemy movements hundreds of miles behind the front lines without their presence being known, but they were also involved in frequent attacks on enemy airfields and garrisons, appearing from nowhere and melting away afterwards. They often appeared to be a bigger force than they were, confusing the enemy as to a major offensive, and causing them to deploy valuable resources to guarding their long supply lines.
They numbered just 90 at the start, rising to around 350, including support staff. As they went about exploring uncharted deserts, they produced the first detailed maps, and latterly found routes to outflank Rommel and literally led the eighth army units through previously impassable terrain in pincer movements around German defences.
The LRDG were the first special forces unit, later followed by the SAS. The SAS were formed primarily as a fighting force, and after an initial logistically catastrophic raid, were teamed up with the LRDG. The LRDG were a self-sufficient unit with their own procurement, workshops, maps, navigation, radios, armament, planes and reported directly to the Commander in Chief Middle East. This provided the SAS with the resources they lacked, gave them transport, and let them concentrate on creating havoc hundreds of miles behind the enemy’s front lines. This was highly effective, although it conflicted with the LRDG low profile intelligence gathering, and eventually the SAS acquired their own transport and became a separate unit.
Whilst the Italians vastly outnumbered the British, they had no stomach for fighting. But they did have an Auto Saharan force, unlike the Germans, who were only capable of fighting in a regimental fashion and had no equivalent units.
The LRDG were not a formal unit in that they had little regimentation and virtually no army issue equipment. They had bought and converted their own trucks, begged borrowed and stole equipment including from the enemy, had their own support planes and heavy supply section, no formal uniform apart from the Scorpion badge on whatever clothing was appropriate to conditions, and no drills or inspections. They did however run their own vigorous training regime, especially in desert navigation by sun or stars. After weeks in the desert a returning unit would be greeted with much suspicion by other soldiers, unwashed and unshaven, they more resembled a band of motorised marauding Arabs than a British elite force.
Their vehicles were unmarked, enabling them to offer a friendly wave to enemy fighters who often mistook them for their own forces, the disadvantage being they were sometimes strafed by the RAF. Occasionally they would venture on to main roads, offering a salute to passing enemy vehicles, and with Italian or German speaking comrades even bluffing their way through enemy roadblocks.
My Uncle, James Wilson, Scots Guards attached to LRDG, Corporal, acting Sergeant, joined in 1940. His parent unit was 2 Battalion Scots Guards. Born 14/9/1919.
There follows some brief highlights in a timeline of desert exploits:
1938 The 2nd Battalion Scots Guards were stationed at Kasr-el-nil Barracks in Cairo. By the end of 1940 they had seen no action, and some were eager to represent their Regiment facing the enemy. The chance to join a fighting unit for some offered an opportunity not to be missed.
1940
July 10th LRDG formed, with Major Ralph A Bagnold as CO
Sept First Patrol of New Zealanders
T, R, & W Patrols, all New Zealanders
On one occasion, unable to get near enough to observe an Italian garrison by vehicle, Captain Pat Clayton put two Arabs and a camel in a lorry and drove them across the desert so they could carry out recognisance un-detected.
First encounter with Italian forces captured a convoy with 2500 gallons of petrol, official war mail, supplies, 7 prisoners and a goat, which surprised the Italians somewhat as they were 650 miles behind their front line.
Italian offensive of 250,000 troops halted amid confusion of attacks on their southern flank supply line by LRDG.
Nov Expanded to 6 patrols, each with 2 officers & 28 other ranks
Dec G Patrol formed from Coldstream & 2nd Battalion Scots Guards under Captain Pat Clayton / Major Crichton-Stuart, comprising 31 NCO’s and Guardsmen. Initially 18 were recruited from each regiment, all volunteers, into what was then an unknown secret unit. (It is interesting that they volunteered only knowing it was a fighting unit, nothing else - whereas in just a few months their exploits became legend and every fighting mans dream unit).
Boxing Day left for Murzuk Raid with 76 men of G & T Patrols plus 10 French and 23 vehicles. Murzuk was an Italian Fort with a garrison of 200 and an airdrome 1000 miles from Cairo but requiring a 1500-mile journey taking 18 days.
1941
David Stirling, Scots Guards, founded the Special Air Service.
Jan LRDG carried out Murzuk Raid on Jan 11th. Two were killed, three shot below the knee, and Guardsman Sgt Wilson incurred a severe leg wound. He was carried by truck to Zouar, via further missions at Treghen, Gatrun & Abd El Galil, arriving on the 20th, then flown to Fort Lany with Bagnold, then Khartoum, having travelled 3000 miles in 16 days to reach the General Hospital in Cairo. It was reported he ‘had survived the shocking journey from Murzuk with admirable fortitude’ and ‘made a good recovery’.
It transpired afterwards that a Frenchman had also been shot in the calf but had just cauterised it with his cigarette and carried on fighting, afterwards he ‘had not bothered’ to see the Doctor.
At Gebel Sherif on Jan 31st Clayton with T Patrol was attacked by 5 Italian cars and 3 aircraft. Clayton was wounded and captured.
Four men presumed killed when their truck exploded had survived and were unknowingly left behind. 1 was wounded in the foot, another in the throat, and only had 14 pints of water between them. They decided to walk back to base, some giving up on the way, but later found although one died. After 10 days the last one was found, Moore, still walking, having covered 210 miles, and was somewhat annoyed as he had wanted to finish the last 80 miles on his own.
Mar Added Y & S Patrols – Southern Rhodesians
Aug Guy Prendergast became CO
Sept Trial road watch on enemy coast road 400 miles behind the front line, but a 600-mile journey from the LRDG base.
Oct T1 Patrol captured two German trucks 50 miles outside of Benghazi, this time the Germans being surprised as they were 500 miles behind their front line at Sollum.
Nov Started road watch to Spring 1942.
S1 Patrol captured a lorry full of Italians, including by chance a Regia Aeronutica pilot who had previously attacked the LRDG. The Italians were, as always, surprised as they were 500 miles from the nearest British position.
Dec The SAS, deployed by the LRDG, were inflicting as much damage on the Luftwaffe as the RAF.
1942
Comprised 25 officers and 278 other ranks
Jan 9 men had their truck destroyed by Stukas, had to spend 8 days walking 200 miles over desert with little water to get to an oasis
Feb G Patrol split, Lieutenant Robin Gurdon commanded G2, Alastair Timpson G1
Mar G2 Jebel road watch carried out with Sgt Wilson, involving a trek of over 60 miles with heavy equipment.
Spring through to December carried out 24-hour Road Watches with 5.00am to 7.00pm day shifts of two soldiers hidden by the roadside.
Involved a week at a time 600 miles from their base.
May Lieutenant Robin Gurdon left Siwa with G2 headed to Benghazi with David Stirling.
On the 21st David Stirling with 5 others (including Randolph Churchill) spent 24 hours carrying out an attack on Benghazi using a British Ford Staff Car 200 miles behind the enemy front line, passing through an Italian roadblock twice.
G1 and T2 were tasked with blowing up enemy trucks on the coast road, without the enemy knowing how that was being done. It was decided to use time bombs thrown into passing trucks. The trouble was the enemy trucks were moving too fast, so they erected German road works to slow them down. This still proved impossible, so Timpson decided to drive a truck without lights behind an enemy vehicle, with Sergeant Fraser sat on the bonnet to lob a time bomb in the back. Unfortunately they came upon a broken down Italian lorry who asked them for a tow, thinking they must be Germans, before they could implement their plan. The impossible had become unbelievable!
July Gurdon and Stirling headed to attack an enemy base and airfield respectively.
Attacked by 3 Italian fighters on way to attack airfield between Fuka and Daba with SAS, Robin Gurdon fatally wounded, attended by his Patrol Sgt Wilson, remaining with him exposed to heavy fire from enemy fighter aircraft. Murrey his driver was severely wounded. The mission was aborted but Gurdon died the following day. Lieutenant Sweeting later took command of G2. Wilson was described as Gunner & Medical Orderly.
85 enemy aircraft destroyed by SAS & LRDG near Fuka & Baggush.
After T Patrol and the SAS attacked one airfield the Germans pursued and attacked the Patrol directed by an aircraft, the aircraft frequently landing to confer with the German troops. Two New Zealanders from T Patrol got fed up with this so followed the plane and next time it landed they shot it up and burnt it.
Sept Failed raid on Tobruk.
Eight German Heinkel’s attacked the LRDG base at Kufra, the LRDG & SAS armed with captured Italian Breda 20mm guns, shot five down.
1943
Italians and Germans in retreat.
February Hons was the new base for the LRDG. G1 and G2 patrols had been decimated in action and was reconstructed into a single G patrol. Three veterans from Murzuk remained, including sergeant Wilson, plus another 14 new recruits mostly Guards. G Patrol was now under Bruce and sent on a scouting patrol around Chott Djerid. This was the last LRDG patrol, covering 3500 miles in 37 days, and was not without incident.
After the patrol they went to Constantine and stopped in Biskra on their way. This was full of fresh American troops yet to see desert or battle. The LRDG were the Yanks first contact with the British 8th Army. Reported at the time as ‘Ay-rabs in Jeeps’, large bearded men in Arab headdress driving desert camouflaged vehicles bristling with guns - not something even encountered in Hollywood movies!
May North Africa under Allied control, Rommel defeated
1947 SAS reformed
Credits:
G Patrol, 1958, Michael Crichton-Stuart
Sergeant Kevin Gorman, Scots Guards Archive
Members of G Patrol after their formation in late 1940, possibly on their way to attack Murzuk.
The Long Range Desert Group members were the brains behind the SAS. Centre of the picture is my uncle Jim Wilson.
Sea of Sand 1958
An article on the premier of the film Sea of Sand about the LRDG. Just 17 of the original members were invited guests. Jim Wilson in photo towards bottom right.
Mail Online Article
Written by REBECCA TAYLOR FOR MAILONLINE
PUBLISHED: 13:25, 13 April 2017
The men of the Long Range Desert Group carried out clandestine operations deep behind enemy lines in the Second World War and were the 'brains' behind the SAS.
They also launched hit-and-run raids and gathered intelligence on German and Italian targets.
They carried out numerous missions in tandem with the SAS, using their unparalleled knowledge of the treacherous Sahara desert to guide the elite unit to enemy airfields where attacks would be launched.
The group traversed huge areas of the Sahara that had never been explored by Europeans before, and their information gathering was so important to success in North Africa that General Bernard Montgomery said without them operations would have been 'a leap in the dark'.
Now, photographs of the men have been released in a new book. 21
One memorable photo is a highly symbolic image of a soldier with his foot on the head of a bust of Mussolini as the Allies began liberating western Libya from Italian rule.
Another remarkable image is of a member of the Long Range Desert Group perched precariously on top of a palm tree from where he carried out reconnaissance.
There are striking images of sandstorms, tanks driving through the desert and a wounded soldier waiting to be flown to hospital.
What the images reveal is the close bond that existed between the members of the unit whose diligence dovetailed perfectly with the superior firepower of the SAS to defeat the enemy.
Cameras were banned so the soldier who took the fascinating photos did so without the authority of his senior officers.
With the surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943, the Long Range Desert Group moved operations to the eastern Mediterranean, carrying out missions in the Greek islands, Italy and the Balkans where they operated in boats, on foot and by parachute.
The short-lived unit - which never numbered more than 350 men - was disbanded in August 1945 after the War Office decided against transferring them to the Far East to conduct operations against the Japanese Empire.
In his book, historian Gavin Mortimer has interviewed surviving veterans and gained special access to the SAS archives to tell the story of the origins and dramatic operations of the unit.
The Long Range Desert Group was the brainchild of a contemporary of Lawrence of Arabia, scientist and soldier Major Ralph Bagnold, who insisted men on the ground were needed to carry out crucial reconnaissance missions which he felt were not possible by air.
They were established almost a year and a half before the SAS were formed in November 1941 making them the first ever special forces unit.
At first the Long Range Desert Group was made up of soldiers from New Zealand since Maj Bagnold was impressed by their 'speed and thoroughness' in adjusting to the extreme desert conditions.
In time, the unit would incorporate soldiers from Britain and Southern Rhodesia.
The extraordinary men of the unit would stay hidden concealed in bushes or ditches for days at a time just yards from German and Italian forces observing the enemy's every move and relaying that valuable information via radio to the SAS.
Mr Mortimer, 46, who lives in Paris, said: 'The Long Range Desert Group was actually established before the SAS and for the war-time generation they were more famous than them.
'It was only the Iranian siege of 1980 which propelled the SAS into public consciousness.
'The Long Range Desert Group disbanded at the end of the war and they have been lost to history so this book is really to make people aware of the importance and contribution of that unit to the Second World War.
'They were the brains of the operation in the desert while the SAS were the brawn. It was their role to navigate them to their targets.
'I believe the Long Range Desert Group were more important and valuable to the winning of the war in North Africa than the SAS.
They would drop deep behind enemy lines and their surveillance was crucial as they reported back to General Montgomery the strength of the Germans and where to attack them.
'They were the eyes and ears of the offensive. What they did was painstaking - they would spend days hidden just yards from the main coastal road which the Germans would use.
'They would take notes of how many vehicles passed, how many soldiers there were and even the mood of the soldiers - if they were singing or depressed - and this information would be radioed back.
'Personnel would work in pairs sometimes hidden in a bush or concealed in a drop in the ground. They would camouflage themselves and observe using binoculars.
'When night came, they would hurry back to their patrol a mile or two further into the desert and would radio in all the information.
'There were very narrow escapes. Once a German convoy camped just yards from where a couple of men were hiding and one of the soldiers wandered over and relieved himself in the bush they were concealed in.
'I began my research three years ago and there were still 15 veterans from the Long Range Desert Group. Now that number is six or seven.
'I was able to speak to some veterans who have never spoken publicly about their experiences before now. They are such a modest generation but what they did took extraordinary discipline and courage.'
The Long Range Desert Group in World War II is written by Gavin Mortimer and costs £25
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The North African campaign began in June 1940 and lasted for three years. Allied and Axis forces pushed one another back across the Sahara.
At this point, the Allies consisted predominantly of British, French and British Indian forces, with the Axis countries being Germany, Japan and Italy.
The Allies had the back up of American forces in North Africa from 1942.
Although both sides had former colonial interests in the region, the Axis aims were around denying the Allies access to Middle Eastern oil supplies and cutting Britain off from the network it had in North Africa.
In three phases, the campaign covered western Egypt and eastern Libya (the Western desert campaign), Algeria and Morocco (Operation Torch) and Tunisia (the Tunisia campaign).
The skirmishes started almost as soon as war was declared, with Italian forces invaded Egypt in September 1940 and British forces responded in December.
There were numerous pushes back and forth, but the Second Battle of El Alamein in late 1942 is regarded as a turning point, when the British army drove Axis troops all the way back through Libya.
Operation Torch of November 1942 brought in thousands of British and American troops, flushing out remaining Axis troops from Tunisia and bringing the campaign to an end.
Throughout the entire three year campaign, Germans and Italians suffered 620,000 casualties, while the British Commonwealth lost 220,000 men. Nearly 900,000 German and Italian troops were killed or 'neutralised' in the conflict.
Allied victory in North Africa allowed the invasion of Italy in 1943.
Sources: The Atlantic and USHMM
PUBLISHED: 13:25, 13 April 2017
The men of the Long Range Desert Group carried out clandestine operations deep behind enemy lines in the Second World War and were the 'brains' behind the SAS.
They also launched hit-and-run raids and gathered intelligence on German and Italian targets.
They carried out numerous missions in tandem with the SAS, using their unparalleled knowledge of the treacherous Sahara desert to guide the elite unit to enemy airfields where attacks would be launched.
The group traversed huge areas of the Sahara that had never been explored by Europeans before, and their information gathering was so important to success in North Africa that General Bernard Montgomery said without them operations would have been 'a leap in the dark'.
Now, photographs of the men have been released in a new book. 21
One memorable photo is a highly symbolic image of a soldier with his foot on the head of a bust of Mussolini as the Allies began liberating western Libya from Italian rule.
Another remarkable image is of a member of the Long Range Desert Group perched precariously on top of a palm tree from where he carried out reconnaissance.
There are striking images of sandstorms, tanks driving through the desert and a wounded soldier waiting to be flown to hospital.
What the images reveal is the close bond that existed between the members of the unit whose diligence dovetailed perfectly with the superior firepower of the SAS to defeat the enemy.
Cameras were banned so the soldier who took the fascinating photos did so without the authority of his senior officers.
With the surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia in May 1943, the Long Range Desert Group moved operations to the eastern Mediterranean, carrying out missions in the Greek islands, Italy and the Balkans where they operated in boats, on foot and by parachute.
The short-lived unit - which never numbered more than 350 men - was disbanded in August 1945 after the War Office decided against transferring them to the Far East to conduct operations against the Japanese Empire.
In his book, historian Gavin Mortimer has interviewed surviving veterans and gained special access to the SAS archives to tell the story of the origins and dramatic operations of the unit.
The Long Range Desert Group was the brainchild of a contemporary of Lawrence of Arabia, scientist and soldier Major Ralph Bagnold, who insisted men on the ground were needed to carry out crucial reconnaissance missions which he felt were not possible by air.
They were established almost a year and a half before the SAS were formed in November 1941 making them the first ever special forces unit.
At first the Long Range Desert Group was made up of soldiers from New Zealand since Maj Bagnold was impressed by their 'speed and thoroughness' in adjusting to the extreme desert conditions.
In time, the unit would incorporate soldiers from Britain and Southern Rhodesia.
The extraordinary men of the unit would stay hidden concealed in bushes or ditches for days at a time just yards from German and Italian forces observing the enemy's every move and relaying that valuable information via radio to the SAS.
Mr Mortimer, 46, who lives in Paris, said: 'The Long Range Desert Group was actually established before the SAS and for the war-time generation they were more famous than them.
'It was only the Iranian siege of 1980 which propelled the SAS into public consciousness.
'The Long Range Desert Group disbanded at the end of the war and they have been lost to history so this book is really to make people aware of the importance and contribution of that unit to the Second World War.
'They were the brains of the operation in the desert while the SAS were the brawn. It was their role to navigate them to their targets.
'I believe the Long Range Desert Group were more important and valuable to the winning of the war in North Africa than the SAS.
They would drop deep behind enemy lines and their surveillance was crucial as they reported back to General Montgomery the strength of the Germans and where to attack them.
'They were the eyes and ears of the offensive. What they did was painstaking - they would spend days hidden just yards from the main coastal road which the Germans would use.
'They would take notes of how many vehicles passed, how many soldiers there were and even the mood of the soldiers - if they were singing or depressed - and this information would be radioed back.
'Personnel would work in pairs sometimes hidden in a bush or concealed in a drop in the ground. They would camouflage themselves and observe using binoculars.
'When night came, they would hurry back to their patrol a mile or two further into the desert and would radio in all the information.
'There were very narrow escapes. Once a German convoy camped just yards from where a couple of men were hiding and one of the soldiers wandered over and relieved himself in the bush they were concealed in.
'I began my research three years ago and there were still 15 veterans from the Long Range Desert Group. Now that number is six or seven.
'I was able to speak to some veterans who have never spoken publicly about their experiences before now. They are such a modest generation but what they did took extraordinary discipline and courage.'
The Long Range Desert Group in World War II is written by Gavin Mortimer and costs £25
THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR
The North African campaign began in June 1940 and lasted for three years. Allied and Axis forces pushed one another back across the Sahara.
At this point, the Allies consisted predominantly of British, French and British Indian forces, with the Axis countries being Germany, Japan and Italy.
The Allies had the back up of American forces in North Africa from 1942.
Although both sides had former colonial interests in the region, the Axis aims were around denying the Allies access to Middle Eastern oil supplies and cutting Britain off from the network it had in North Africa.
In three phases, the campaign covered western Egypt and eastern Libya (the Western desert campaign), Algeria and Morocco (Operation Torch) and Tunisia (the Tunisia campaign).
The skirmishes started almost as soon as war was declared, with Italian forces invaded Egypt in September 1940 and British forces responded in December.
There were numerous pushes back and forth, but the Second Battle of El Alamein in late 1942 is regarded as a turning point, when the British army drove Axis troops all the way back through Libya.
Operation Torch of November 1942 brought in thousands of British and American troops, flushing out remaining Axis troops from Tunisia and bringing the campaign to an end.
Throughout the entire three year campaign, Germans and Italians suffered 620,000 casualties, while the British Commonwealth lost 220,000 men. Nearly 900,000 German and Italian troops were killed or 'neutralised' in the conflict.
Allied victory in North Africa allowed the invasion of Italy in 1943.
Sources: The Atlantic and USHMM
The Men Who Saved the SAS: Major Ralph Bagnold and the Long Range Desert Group
27th November 2017 By Gavin Mortimer
Ralph Bagnold was as unlikely a special forces commander as anyone could imagine. His war had been the Great War, when as a junior signals officer he had survived the carnage of the Western Front. When World War II began in September 1939, Bagnold was 43 and earning a comfortable living as a scientist and writer.
Recalled to the colours four years after he had retired from the army, Major Bagnold was posted to Officer Commanding, East Africa Signals, and dispatched on a troopship to Kenya. But he never arrived. In early October, Bagnold’s vessel, RMS Franconia, collided with a merchant cruiser in the Mediterranean. He and the rest of his troop transferred to another vessel and sailed to Port Said in Egypt to await the first available ship to Kenya.
Bagnold was delighted. Egypt was a country he knew well, better in fact than nearly any other Briton. He had spent most of the 1920s in Egypt with his regiment, entranced by the culture and the vast desert that stretched west into Libya. In 1927, he made his first foray into the Libyan desert, leading a small band of explorers in a fleet of Model T Fords. More expeditions followed, penetrating farther into the desert’s brutal interior than any other European had. Bagnold’s fascination was as much motivated by science as by exploration, and he began studying the terrain, leading him to publish the critically acclaimed The Physics of Blown Sand And Desert Dunes in 1939.
Back in Egypt, Bagnold took the train from Port Said to Cairo to look up old friends. He dined with one such acquaintance in the restaurant of the exclusive Shepheard’s Hotel, where he was spotted by the gossip columnist of The Egyptian Gazettenewspaper. A few days later, the word was out that Bagnold was back in town, and within a matter of days he was summoned to the office of General Archibald Wavell, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Middle East Command.
Wavell pumped Bagnold for information on the accessibility of the Libyan Desert – the general was increasingly concerned by intelligence reports that the Italians had as many as 250,000 men in 15 divisions under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. So impressed was he by what Bagnold told him that Wavell arranged for his permanent transfer to North Africa.
General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, at his desk, 15 August 1940. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205193528Bagnold’s vision brought to lifeBagnold was sent to Mersa Matruh – 135 miles west of Cairo – where he discovered that the most up-to-date map the British forces possessed of Libya dated from 1915. He was similarly appalled by the indifference of senior officers to the threat posed by the Italians – they believed the enemy would make a full-frontal attack on Mersa Matruh, which they would easily repel, but Bagnold suspected the Italians, some of whom he had encountered during his expeditions of the 1920s, would launch surprise attacks on British positions in Egypt from further south.
Bagnold’s idea was to form a small reconnaissance force to patrol the 700-mile frontier with Libya. This was rejected, as it was when he submitted it again in January 1940, and the following month Bagnold was posted as a military advisor to Turkey, presumably to give Middle East Headquarters (MEHQ) in Cairo some peace and quiet.
But Bagnold wouldn’t give up, and after Italy declared war on Britain on 10 June 1940, he tried for a third time to convince the top brass of his idea, explaining in an additional paragraph that there would be three patrols:
“Every vehicle of which, with a crew of three and a machine gun, was to carry its own supplies of food and water for three weeks, and its own petrol for 2,500 miles of travel across average soft desert surface… [each] patrol to carry a wireless set, navigating and other equipment, medical stores, spare parts and further tools.”
This time Bagnold entrusted his friend, Brigadier Dick Baker, to ensure the proposal was put directly into the hands of Wavell. Baker obliged and within four days of receiving Bagnold’s proposition, Wavell had authorised him to form the new unit, provisionally entitled the Long Range Patrol (LRP).
Wavell was a hard taskmaster, however, giving Bagnold just six weeks to make his vision a reality. Men, equipment, rations, weapons, vehicles… it was a formidable challenge but one that Bagnold rose to. First, he searched for the soldiers; he tracked down most of his old companions from his exploration days, and while one or two were unable to secure a release from their military duty, Bagnold was soon joined in Cairo by Bill Kennedy-Shaw and Pat Clayton, who by 1940 had accumulated nearly 20 years of experience with the Egyptian Survey Department. Also recruited to the new unit was captain Teddy Mitford, a relative of the infamous sisters and a desert explorer in his own right during the late 1930s.
While Clayton, Mitford and Kennedy-Shaw started to hunt down the necessary equipment, Bagnold flew to Palestine on 29 June to see Lt-General Thomas Blamey, commander of the Australian Corps. Bagnold requested permission to recruit 80 Australian soldiers, explaining that in his view Australians would be the Allied soldiers most likely to adapt quickest to desert reconnaissance. Blamey, on the orders of his government, refused, so Bagnold turned to the New Zealand forces in Egypt.
This time he met with success, and 80 officers, non-commissioned officers and men from the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment and Machine-Gun Battalion volunteered to be part of the LRP. Bagnold took an instant shine to the Kiwis, saying:
“They made an impressive party by English standards. Tougher and more weather-beaten in looks, a sturdy basis of sheep-farmers, leavened by technicians, property-owners and professional men, and including a few Maoris. Shrewd, dry-humoured, curious of every new thing, and quietly thrilled when I told them what we were to do.”
July was spent assembling the vehicles and equipment and training the New Zealanders in the rudiments of desert motoring and navigation. Kennedy-Shaw, appointed the unit’s intelligence officer, told the Kiwis that the Libyan Desert measured 1,200 miles by 1,000 – or put another way, was roughly the size of India. It was bordered by the Nile in the east and the Mediterranean in the north. In the south, which was limestone compared to the sandstone in the north, the desert extended as far as the Tibesti Mountains, while the political frontier with Tunisia and Algeria marked its western limits.
A well-loaded Chevrolet truck about to set off on patrol from Siwa. This vehicle was crewed by New Zealanders, many of whom joined the Long Range Desert Group in 1940 from a consignment of troops who found themselves at Alexandria without their arms and equipment, which had been lost at sea. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205125571The unit proves its worthBy the first week of August 1940, the unit was ready for its first patrol and the honour fell to 44-year-old Captain Pat Clayton. He and his small hand-picked party of seven left Cairo in two Chevrolet trucks. Crossing the border into Libya, they continued on to Siwa Oasis, where Alexander the Great had led his army in 332 BCE. “The little patrol of two cars then struck due west, exploring, and made the unwelcome discovery of a large strip of sand sea between the frontier and the Jalo-Kufra road,” wrote Clayton in his subsequent report. “The Chevrolet clutches began to smell a bit by the time we got across, but the evening saw us near the Kufra track.”
They laid up here for three days, taking great care to conceal their presence from the Italians, as they observed the track for signs of activity. They returned to Cairo on 19 August, having covered 1,600 miles of the barren desert in 13 days.
Clayton and Bagnold reported their findings to General Wavell, who, having heard an account of the unit’s first patrol, “made up his mind then and there to give us his strongest backing.” A week later, Wavell inspected the LRP and told them he had informed the War Office they “were ready to take the field.”
Bagnold split the LRP into three patrols, assigning to each a letter of no particular significance. Captain Teddy Mitford commanded W Patrol, Captains Pat Clayton and Bruce Ballantyne (a New Zealander) were the officers in charge of T Patrol and Captain Don Steele, a New Zealand farmer from Takapu, led R Patrol. Each patrol consisted of 25 other ranks, transported in ten 30-cwt Chevrolet trucks and a light 15-cwt pilot car. They carried rations and equipment to sustain them over 1,500 miles and for armament each patrol possessed a 3.7mm Bofors gun, four Boys AT (anti-tank) rifles and 15 Lewis guns.
For the next two months the LRP reconnoitred large swathes of central Libya, often enduring daytime temperatures in excess of 49 degrees Celsius as they probed for signs of Italian troop movements.
On 19 September, Mitford’s patrol encountered two Italian six-ton lorries and opened fire, giving the aristocratic Englishman the honour of blooding the LRP in battle. In truth, it wasn’t much of a battle; the Italians, stunned to meet the enemy so far west, quickly waved a white flag. The prisoners were brought back to Cairo, along with 2,500 gallons of petrol and a bag of official mail.
General Wavell was delighted, not just with the official mail that contained much important intelligence but with the LRP’s work throughout the autumn of 1940. Bagnold capitalised on the praise with a request to expand the unit, suggesting to Wavell that with more men he could strike fear into the Italians by launching a series of hit-and-run attacks across a wide region of Libya. On 22 November, Bagnold was promoted to acting lieutenant-colonel and given permission to form two new patrols and reconstitute the Long Range Patrol as the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG).
For his new recruits, Bagnold turned to the British army and what he considered the cream: the Guards and the Yeomanry Divisions. By the end of December, he had formed G (Guards) Patrol, consisting of 36 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion The Coldstream Guards and the 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards, commanded by Captain Michael Crichton-Stuart. Y Patrol was raised a couple of months later, composed of men from, among others, the Yorkshire Hussars, the North Somerset Yeomanry and the Staffordshire Yeomanry. For their inaugural operation, however, G Patrol was placed under the command of Pat Clayton, whose T Patrol would offer support.
Two Long Range Desert Group patrols meet in the desert. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205194946A successful first missionTheir target was Murzuk, a well-defended Italian fort in south-western Libya, nestled among palm trees with an airfield close by. The fort was approximately 1,000 miles to the west of Cairo as the crow flies, and reaching it entailed a gruelling journey that lasted for a fortnight. There were 76 raiders in all, travelling in 23 vehicles, including nine members of the Free French who had been seconded to the operation in return for flying up additional supplies from their base in Chad.
The raiding party stopped for lunch on 11 January, just a few miles from Murzuk, and finalised their plan for the attack: Clayton’s T Patrol would attack the airfield that lay in close proximity to the fort while G Patrol targeted the actual garrison. Crichton-Stuart recalled that as they neared the fort, they passed a lone cyclist:
“This gentleman, who proved to be the postmaster, was added to the party with his bicycle. As the convoy approached the fort, above the main central tower of which the Italian flag flew proudly, the guard turned out. We were rather sorry for them, but they probably never knew what hit them.”
Opening fire 150 yards from the fort’s main gates, the LRDG force split, with the six trucks of Clayton’s patrol heading towards the airstrip. The terrain was up and down, and the LRDG made use of its undulations to destroy a number of pillboxes scattered about, including an anti-aircraft pit.
Clayton, in the vanguard of the assault, circled a hangar and as he turned the corner, ran straight into a concealed machine gun nest. The Free French officer was shot dead but Clayton soon silenced the enemy position, and by the time his patrol withdrew, they had been responsible for the destruction of three light bombers, a sizeable fuel dump and killed or captured all of the 20 guards.
Meanwhile, G Patrol had subjected the fort to a withering mortar barrage, and after a brief fire fight, the garrison surrendered. Clayton selected two prisoners to bring back to Cairo for interrogation and the rest were left in the shattered remnants of the fort to await the arrival of reinforcements once it was realised the fort’s communications were down.
Headdress worn by a member of the LRDG Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30103120The Nazis push backFollowing the Allied advance across Libya in the winter of 1940-41, Adolf Hitler had despatched General Erwin Rommel and the Deutsches Afrika Korps to reinforce their Italian allies. The Nazi leader had initially been reluctant to get involved in North Africa, but Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the German navy, warned that if the British maintained their iron grip on the Mediterranean, it would seriously jeopardise his plans for conquest in Eastern Europe.
Rommel wasted little time in attacking the British, launching an offensive on 2 April that ultimately pushed his enemy out of Libya and back into Egypt, right where they had been in 1940. The British managed to hold on to only a couple of footholds in Libya, in the port of Tobruk and 500 miles south in the Oasis of Kufra. On 9 April, Bagnold and most of the LRDG were sent to garrison Kufra, to pass a summer of tedious inactivity that frayed Bagnold’s usually equitable temper. He was also beginning to feel the strain of command, oppressed by the heat and the constant scuttling forth between Cairo and Kufra, and so on 1 August he handed over command of the LRDG to Lt-Colonel Guy Prendergast.
Prendergast had explored the Libyan Desert with Bagnold in the 1920s but had remained in the Royal Tank Regiment. Dour, laconic and precise, Prendergast kept his emotions hidden behind a cool exterior as he did his eyes behind a pair of circular sunglasses. Not to be underestimated, he was innovative, open-minded and a brilliant administrator.
His first challenge as the LRDG’s new commander was to organise five reconnaissance patrols for a new large-scale Allied offensive (codenamed Operation Crusader) on 18 November. The aim of the offensive, planned by General Claude Auchinleck, the successor to the sacked General Wavell, was to retake eastern Libya and its airfields, thereby enabling the RAF to increase its supplies to Malta.
Three Long Range Desert Group 30-cwt Chevrolet trucks, surrounded by desert. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205196758The SAS arriveThe LRDG’s role was the observation and reporting of enemy troop movements, alerting Auchinleck as to what Rommel might be planning in response to the offensive. But they had an additional responsibility: to collect 55 British paratroopers after they’d attacked enemy airfields at Gazala and Tmimi. This small unit had been raised four months earlier by a charismatic young officer called David Stirling and had been designated L Detachment Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade.
Stirling had convinced MEHQ that the enemy was vulnerable to attack along the line of its coastal communications and various aerodromes and supply dumps, by small units of airborne troops attacking not just one target but a series of objectives. Stirling and his men parachuted into Libya on the night of 17 November into what one war correspondent described as “the most spectacular thunderstorm within local memory.” Many of the SAS raiders were injured on landing; others were captured in the hours that followed. The 21 storm-ravaged survivors were eventually rescued by the LRDG and driven to safety, among them a bitterly disappointed Stirling.
It was Lt-Colonel Prendergast who resuscitated the SAS. Receiving an order in late November from MEHQ instructing the LRDG to launch a series of raids against Axis airfields to coincide with a secondary Eighth Army offensive, he signalled: “As LRDG not trained for demolitions, suggest pct [parachutists] used for blowing ‘dromes’.” Additionally, Prendergast suggested that it would be more practical for the LRDG to transport the SAS in their trucks.
On 8 December, an LRDG patrol of 19 Rhodesian soldiers and commanded by Captain Charles ‘Gus’ Holliman left Jalo Oasis to take two SAS raiding parties (one led by Stirling, the other by his second-in-command Blair ‘Paddy’ Mayne) to the airfields at Tamet and Sirte, 350 miles to the north west. Holliman’s navigator was an Englishman, Mike Sadler, who had emigrated to Rhodesia in 1937.
The raiding party made good progress in the first two days but then hit a wide expanse of rocky broken ground, covering just 20 miles in three painstaking hours on the morning of 11 December. Soon, however, the going underfoot became the least of their problems. “Suddenly we heard the drone of a Ghibli (the Caproni Ca.309, a reconnaissance aircraft),” recalled Cecil ‘Jacko’ Jackson, one of the Rhodesian LRDG soldiers. “Not having room to manoeuvre in the rough terrain, Holliman ordered us all to fire on his command. The plane was low, and when all five Lewis guns opened up, he veered off and his bombs missed.”
The Ghibli broke off the fight but the British knew the pilot would have already been on the radio. It was only a matter of minutes before fighter aircraft appeared overhead. “We doubled back to a patch of scrub we had passed earlier,” said Jackson, who, along with his comrades, made frantic efforts to camouflage their vehicles with netting. “We had just hidden ourselves when three aircraft came over us and strafed the scrub.”
It was obvious to the Italians where the enemy were hiding, but they were firing blind all the same, tattooing the ground with machine gun fire without being able to see their targets. It was a terrifying experience for the LRDG and SAS men cowering among the patchy cover, feeling utterly helpless. All they could do was remain motionless, fighting the natural impulse to run from the fire. “I was lying face down near some scrub and heard and felt something thudding into the ground around me,” remembered Jackson. He didn’t flinch. Only when the drone of the aircraft grew so faint as to be barely audible did he and his comrades get to their feet. Jackson looked down, blanching at “bullet holes [that] had made a neat curve round the imprint of my head and shoulders in the sand.”
A member of a Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) patrol poses with a Vickers ‘K’ Gas-operated machine gun on a Chevrolet 30cwt truck, May 1942. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205196170Remarkably, the strafing caused no damage and the patrol moved off, reaching the outskirts of the targets without further incident. The plan was for Stirling and Sergeant Jimmy Brough to attack Sirte airfield while Paddy Mayne and the rest of the SAS hit Tamet. They left the following night, leaving the LRDG at the rendezvous in Wadi Tamet. At about 11.15pm, the silence was shattered by a thunderous roar three miles distant. “We saw the explosions and got quite excited, the adrenaline pumping through us,” recalled Sadler. “The SAS were similarly excited when they arrived back at the RV. We buzzed them home and on the way they talked us through the raid, discussing what could be improved next time.”
Though Stirling had drawn a blank at Sirte, Mayne had blown up 24 aircraft at Tamet. More successful co-operation between the LRDG and the SAS ensued with a five-man raiding party led by Lt Bill Fraser destroying 37 aircraft on Agedabia airfield. Mayne returned to Tamet at the end of December, laying waste to 27 planes that had recently arrived to replace the ones he’d accounted for a couple of weeks earlier.
Stirling and the SAS continued to rely on the LRDG as their ‘Libyan Taxi Service’ for the first six months of 1942, and he also looked to them for guidance in nurturing his embryonic SAS. “We passed on our knowledge to the SAS and they were very grateful to receive it,” recalled Jim Patch, who joined the LRDG in 1941. “David Stirling was a frequent visitor and he would chat and absorb things. He took advice, man to man, he didn’t just stick with the officers, he went round to the men, too.”
In the first six months of 1942, the SAS, thanks in no small measure to the LRDG, had destroyed 143 enemy aircraft. As Stirling noted:
“By the end of June, L Detachment had raided all the more important German and Italian aerodromes within 300 miles of the forward area at least once or twice. Methods of defence were beginning to improve and although the advantage still lay with L Detachment, the time had come to alter our own methods.”
For the rest of the war in North Africa, the SAS operated largely independently of the LRDG, using their own jeeps obtained in Cairo and their own navigators, now trained by the LRDG in the art of desert navigation. While the SAS conducted numerous hit-and-run raids against airfields and – following the El Alamein offensive – retreating Axis transport columns, the LRDG reverted to its original role of reconnaissance.
It was one that it accomplished with extraordinary diligence and endurance, often keeping enemy roads and positions under observation for days at a time, radioing back the vital intelligence to Cairo. With the desert war all but won, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Eighth Army, conveyed his thanks for the LRDG’s magnificent work in a letter to Prendergast dated 2 April 1943, praising “the excellent work done by your patrols” in reconnoitring the country into which his soldiers had advanced.
In 1984, David Stirling expressed his thanks to the LRDG in an address to an audience gathered for the opening of the refurbished SAS base in Hereford, named Stirling Lines, in honour of the regiment’s founder. “In those early days we came to owe the Long Range Desert Group a deep debt of gratitude,” said Stirling. “The LRDG were the supreme professionals of the desert and they were unstinting in their help.”
Ralph Bagnold was as unlikely a special forces commander as anyone could imagine. His war had been the Great War, when as a junior signals officer he had survived the carnage of the Western Front. When World War II began in September 1939, Bagnold was 43 and earning a comfortable living as a scientist and writer.
Recalled to the colours four years after he had retired from the army, Major Bagnold was posted to Officer Commanding, East Africa Signals, and dispatched on a troopship to Kenya. But he never arrived. In early October, Bagnold’s vessel, RMS Franconia, collided with a merchant cruiser in the Mediterranean. He and the rest of his troop transferred to another vessel and sailed to Port Said in Egypt to await the first available ship to Kenya.
Bagnold was delighted. Egypt was a country he knew well, better in fact than nearly any other Briton. He had spent most of the 1920s in Egypt with his regiment, entranced by the culture and the vast desert that stretched west into Libya. In 1927, he made his first foray into the Libyan desert, leading a small band of explorers in a fleet of Model T Fords. More expeditions followed, penetrating farther into the desert’s brutal interior than any other European had. Bagnold’s fascination was as much motivated by science as by exploration, and he began studying the terrain, leading him to publish the critically acclaimed The Physics of Blown Sand And Desert Dunes in 1939.
Back in Egypt, Bagnold took the train from Port Said to Cairo to look up old friends. He dined with one such acquaintance in the restaurant of the exclusive Shepheard’s Hotel, where he was spotted by the gossip columnist of The Egyptian Gazettenewspaper. A few days later, the word was out that Bagnold was back in town, and within a matter of days he was summoned to the office of General Archibald Wavell, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Middle East Command.
Wavell pumped Bagnold for information on the accessibility of the Libyan Desert – the general was increasingly concerned by intelligence reports that the Italians had as many as 250,000 men in 15 divisions under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani. So impressed was he by what Bagnold told him that Wavell arranged for his permanent transfer to North Africa.
General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander-in-Chief Middle East, at his desk, 15 August 1940. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205193528Bagnold’s vision brought to lifeBagnold was sent to Mersa Matruh – 135 miles west of Cairo – where he discovered that the most up-to-date map the British forces possessed of Libya dated from 1915. He was similarly appalled by the indifference of senior officers to the threat posed by the Italians – they believed the enemy would make a full-frontal attack on Mersa Matruh, which they would easily repel, but Bagnold suspected the Italians, some of whom he had encountered during his expeditions of the 1920s, would launch surprise attacks on British positions in Egypt from further south.
Bagnold’s idea was to form a small reconnaissance force to patrol the 700-mile frontier with Libya. This was rejected, as it was when he submitted it again in January 1940, and the following month Bagnold was posted as a military advisor to Turkey, presumably to give Middle East Headquarters (MEHQ) in Cairo some peace and quiet.
But Bagnold wouldn’t give up, and after Italy declared war on Britain on 10 June 1940, he tried for a third time to convince the top brass of his idea, explaining in an additional paragraph that there would be three patrols:
“Every vehicle of which, with a crew of three and a machine gun, was to carry its own supplies of food and water for three weeks, and its own petrol for 2,500 miles of travel across average soft desert surface… [each] patrol to carry a wireless set, navigating and other equipment, medical stores, spare parts and further tools.”
This time Bagnold entrusted his friend, Brigadier Dick Baker, to ensure the proposal was put directly into the hands of Wavell. Baker obliged and within four days of receiving Bagnold’s proposition, Wavell had authorised him to form the new unit, provisionally entitled the Long Range Patrol (LRP).
Wavell was a hard taskmaster, however, giving Bagnold just six weeks to make his vision a reality. Men, equipment, rations, weapons, vehicles… it was a formidable challenge but one that Bagnold rose to. First, he searched for the soldiers; he tracked down most of his old companions from his exploration days, and while one or two were unable to secure a release from their military duty, Bagnold was soon joined in Cairo by Bill Kennedy-Shaw and Pat Clayton, who by 1940 had accumulated nearly 20 years of experience with the Egyptian Survey Department. Also recruited to the new unit was captain Teddy Mitford, a relative of the infamous sisters and a desert explorer in his own right during the late 1930s.
While Clayton, Mitford and Kennedy-Shaw started to hunt down the necessary equipment, Bagnold flew to Palestine on 29 June to see Lt-General Thomas Blamey, commander of the Australian Corps. Bagnold requested permission to recruit 80 Australian soldiers, explaining that in his view Australians would be the Allied soldiers most likely to adapt quickest to desert reconnaissance. Blamey, on the orders of his government, refused, so Bagnold turned to the New Zealand forces in Egypt.
This time he met with success, and 80 officers, non-commissioned officers and men from the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry Regiment and Machine-Gun Battalion volunteered to be part of the LRP. Bagnold took an instant shine to the Kiwis, saying:
“They made an impressive party by English standards. Tougher and more weather-beaten in looks, a sturdy basis of sheep-farmers, leavened by technicians, property-owners and professional men, and including a few Maoris. Shrewd, dry-humoured, curious of every new thing, and quietly thrilled when I told them what we were to do.”
July was spent assembling the vehicles and equipment and training the New Zealanders in the rudiments of desert motoring and navigation. Kennedy-Shaw, appointed the unit’s intelligence officer, told the Kiwis that the Libyan Desert measured 1,200 miles by 1,000 – or put another way, was roughly the size of India. It was bordered by the Nile in the east and the Mediterranean in the north. In the south, which was limestone compared to the sandstone in the north, the desert extended as far as the Tibesti Mountains, while the political frontier with Tunisia and Algeria marked its western limits.
A well-loaded Chevrolet truck about to set off on patrol from Siwa. This vehicle was crewed by New Zealanders, many of whom joined the Long Range Desert Group in 1940 from a consignment of troops who found themselves at Alexandria without their arms and equipment, which had been lost at sea. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205125571The unit proves its worthBy the first week of August 1940, the unit was ready for its first patrol and the honour fell to 44-year-old Captain Pat Clayton. He and his small hand-picked party of seven left Cairo in two Chevrolet trucks. Crossing the border into Libya, they continued on to Siwa Oasis, where Alexander the Great had led his army in 332 BCE. “The little patrol of two cars then struck due west, exploring, and made the unwelcome discovery of a large strip of sand sea between the frontier and the Jalo-Kufra road,” wrote Clayton in his subsequent report. “The Chevrolet clutches began to smell a bit by the time we got across, but the evening saw us near the Kufra track.”
They laid up here for three days, taking great care to conceal their presence from the Italians, as they observed the track for signs of activity. They returned to Cairo on 19 August, having covered 1,600 miles of the barren desert in 13 days.
Clayton and Bagnold reported their findings to General Wavell, who, having heard an account of the unit’s first patrol, “made up his mind then and there to give us his strongest backing.” A week later, Wavell inspected the LRP and told them he had informed the War Office they “were ready to take the field.”
Bagnold split the LRP into three patrols, assigning to each a letter of no particular significance. Captain Teddy Mitford commanded W Patrol, Captains Pat Clayton and Bruce Ballantyne (a New Zealander) were the officers in charge of T Patrol and Captain Don Steele, a New Zealand farmer from Takapu, led R Patrol. Each patrol consisted of 25 other ranks, transported in ten 30-cwt Chevrolet trucks and a light 15-cwt pilot car. They carried rations and equipment to sustain them over 1,500 miles and for armament each patrol possessed a 3.7mm Bofors gun, four Boys AT (anti-tank) rifles and 15 Lewis guns.
For the next two months the LRP reconnoitred large swathes of central Libya, often enduring daytime temperatures in excess of 49 degrees Celsius as they probed for signs of Italian troop movements.
On 19 September, Mitford’s patrol encountered two Italian six-ton lorries and opened fire, giving the aristocratic Englishman the honour of blooding the LRP in battle. In truth, it wasn’t much of a battle; the Italians, stunned to meet the enemy so far west, quickly waved a white flag. The prisoners were brought back to Cairo, along with 2,500 gallons of petrol and a bag of official mail.
General Wavell was delighted, not just with the official mail that contained much important intelligence but with the LRP’s work throughout the autumn of 1940. Bagnold capitalised on the praise with a request to expand the unit, suggesting to Wavell that with more men he could strike fear into the Italians by launching a series of hit-and-run attacks across a wide region of Libya. On 22 November, Bagnold was promoted to acting lieutenant-colonel and given permission to form two new patrols and reconstitute the Long Range Patrol as the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG).
For his new recruits, Bagnold turned to the British army and what he considered the cream: the Guards and the Yeomanry Divisions. By the end of December, he had formed G (Guards) Patrol, consisting of 36 soldiers from the 3rd Battalion The Coldstream Guards and the 2nd Battalion The Scots Guards, commanded by Captain Michael Crichton-Stuart. Y Patrol was raised a couple of months later, composed of men from, among others, the Yorkshire Hussars, the North Somerset Yeomanry and the Staffordshire Yeomanry. For their inaugural operation, however, G Patrol was placed under the command of Pat Clayton, whose T Patrol would offer support.
Two Long Range Desert Group patrols meet in the desert. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205194946A successful first missionTheir target was Murzuk, a well-defended Italian fort in south-western Libya, nestled among palm trees with an airfield close by. The fort was approximately 1,000 miles to the west of Cairo as the crow flies, and reaching it entailed a gruelling journey that lasted for a fortnight. There were 76 raiders in all, travelling in 23 vehicles, including nine members of the Free French who had been seconded to the operation in return for flying up additional supplies from their base in Chad.
The raiding party stopped for lunch on 11 January, just a few miles from Murzuk, and finalised their plan for the attack: Clayton’s T Patrol would attack the airfield that lay in close proximity to the fort while G Patrol targeted the actual garrison. Crichton-Stuart recalled that as they neared the fort, they passed a lone cyclist:
“This gentleman, who proved to be the postmaster, was added to the party with his bicycle. As the convoy approached the fort, above the main central tower of which the Italian flag flew proudly, the guard turned out. We were rather sorry for them, but they probably never knew what hit them.”
Opening fire 150 yards from the fort’s main gates, the LRDG force split, with the six trucks of Clayton’s patrol heading towards the airstrip. The terrain was up and down, and the LRDG made use of its undulations to destroy a number of pillboxes scattered about, including an anti-aircraft pit.
Clayton, in the vanguard of the assault, circled a hangar and as he turned the corner, ran straight into a concealed machine gun nest. The Free French officer was shot dead but Clayton soon silenced the enemy position, and by the time his patrol withdrew, they had been responsible for the destruction of three light bombers, a sizeable fuel dump and killed or captured all of the 20 guards.
Meanwhile, G Patrol had subjected the fort to a withering mortar barrage, and after a brief fire fight, the garrison surrendered. Clayton selected two prisoners to bring back to Cairo for interrogation and the rest were left in the shattered remnants of the fort to await the arrival of reinforcements once it was realised the fort’s communications were down.
Headdress worn by a member of the LRDG Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/30103120The Nazis push backFollowing the Allied advance across Libya in the winter of 1940-41, Adolf Hitler had despatched General Erwin Rommel and the Deutsches Afrika Korps to reinforce their Italian allies. The Nazi leader had initially been reluctant to get involved in North Africa, but Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the German navy, warned that if the British maintained their iron grip on the Mediterranean, it would seriously jeopardise his plans for conquest in Eastern Europe.
Rommel wasted little time in attacking the British, launching an offensive on 2 April that ultimately pushed his enemy out of Libya and back into Egypt, right where they had been in 1940. The British managed to hold on to only a couple of footholds in Libya, in the port of Tobruk and 500 miles south in the Oasis of Kufra. On 9 April, Bagnold and most of the LRDG were sent to garrison Kufra, to pass a summer of tedious inactivity that frayed Bagnold’s usually equitable temper. He was also beginning to feel the strain of command, oppressed by the heat and the constant scuttling forth between Cairo and Kufra, and so on 1 August he handed over command of the LRDG to Lt-Colonel Guy Prendergast.
Prendergast had explored the Libyan Desert with Bagnold in the 1920s but had remained in the Royal Tank Regiment. Dour, laconic and precise, Prendergast kept his emotions hidden behind a cool exterior as he did his eyes behind a pair of circular sunglasses. Not to be underestimated, he was innovative, open-minded and a brilliant administrator.
His first challenge as the LRDG’s new commander was to organise five reconnaissance patrols for a new large-scale Allied offensive (codenamed Operation Crusader) on 18 November. The aim of the offensive, planned by General Claude Auchinleck, the successor to the sacked General Wavell, was to retake eastern Libya and its airfields, thereby enabling the RAF to increase its supplies to Malta.
Three Long Range Desert Group 30-cwt Chevrolet trucks, surrounded by desert. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205196758The SAS arriveThe LRDG’s role was the observation and reporting of enemy troop movements, alerting Auchinleck as to what Rommel might be planning in response to the offensive. But they had an additional responsibility: to collect 55 British paratroopers after they’d attacked enemy airfields at Gazala and Tmimi. This small unit had been raised four months earlier by a charismatic young officer called David Stirling and had been designated L Detachment Special Air Service (SAS) Brigade.
Stirling had convinced MEHQ that the enemy was vulnerable to attack along the line of its coastal communications and various aerodromes and supply dumps, by small units of airborne troops attacking not just one target but a series of objectives. Stirling and his men parachuted into Libya on the night of 17 November into what one war correspondent described as “the most spectacular thunderstorm within local memory.” Many of the SAS raiders were injured on landing; others were captured in the hours that followed. The 21 storm-ravaged survivors were eventually rescued by the LRDG and driven to safety, among them a bitterly disappointed Stirling.
It was Lt-Colonel Prendergast who resuscitated the SAS. Receiving an order in late November from MEHQ instructing the LRDG to launch a series of raids against Axis airfields to coincide with a secondary Eighth Army offensive, he signalled: “As LRDG not trained for demolitions, suggest pct [parachutists] used for blowing ‘dromes’.” Additionally, Prendergast suggested that it would be more practical for the LRDG to transport the SAS in their trucks.
On 8 December, an LRDG patrol of 19 Rhodesian soldiers and commanded by Captain Charles ‘Gus’ Holliman left Jalo Oasis to take two SAS raiding parties (one led by Stirling, the other by his second-in-command Blair ‘Paddy’ Mayne) to the airfields at Tamet and Sirte, 350 miles to the north west. Holliman’s navigator was an Englishman, Mike Sadler, who had emigrated to Rhodesia in 1937.
The raiding party made good progress in the first two days but then hit a wide expanse of rocky broken ground, covering just 20 miles in three painstaking hours on the morning of 11 December. Soon, however, the going underfoot became the least of their problems. “Suddenly we heard the drone of a Ghibli (the Caproni Ca.309, a reconnaissance aircraft),” recalled Cecil ‘Jacko’ Jackson, one of the Rhodesian LRDG soldiers. “Not having room to manoeuvre in the rough terrain, Holliman ordered us all to fire on his command. The plane was low, and when all five Lewis guns opened up, he veered off and his bombs missed.”
The Ghibli broke off the fight but the British knew the pilot would have already been on the radio. It was only a matter of minutes before fighter aircraft appeared overhead. “We doubled back to a patch of scrub we had passed earlier,” said Jackson, who, along with his comrades, made frantic efforts to camouflage their vehicles with netting. “We had just hidden ourselves when three aircraft came over us and strafed the scrub.”
It was obvious to the Italians where the enemy were hiding, but they were firing blind all the same, tattooing the ground with machine gun fire without being able to see their targets. It was a terrifying experience for the LRDG and SAS men cowering among the patchy cover, feeling utterly helpless. All they could do was remain motionless, fighting the natural impulse to run from the fire. “I was lying face down near some scrub and heard and felt something thudding into the ground around me,” remembered Jackson. He didn’t flinch. Only when the drone of the aircraft grew so faint as to be barely audible did he and his comrades get to their feet. Jackson looked down, blanching at “bullet holes [that] had made a neat curve round the imprint of my head and shoulders in the sand.”
A member of a Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) patrol poses with a Vickers ‘K’ Gas-operated machine gun on a Chevrolet 30cwt truck, May 1942. Copyright: © IWM. Original Source: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205196170Remarkably, the strafing caused no damage and the patrol moved off, reaching the outskirts of the targets without further incident. The plan was for Stirling and Sergeant Jimmy Brough to attack Sirte airfield while Paddy Mayne and the rest of the SAS hit Tamet. They left the following night, leaving the LRDG at the rendezvous in Wadi Tamet. At about 11.15pm, the silence was shattered by a thunderous roar three miles distant. “We saw the explosions and got quite excited, the adrenaline pumping through us,” recalled Sadler. “The SAS were similarly excited when they arrived back at the RV. We buzzed them home and on the way they talked us through the raid, discussing what could be improved next time.”
Though Stirling had drawn a blank at Sirte, Mayne had blown up 24 aircraft at Tamet. More successful co-operation between the LRDG and the SAS ensued with a five-man raiding party led by Lt Bill Fraser destroying 37 aircraft on Agedabia airfield. Mayne returned to Tamet at the end of December, laying waste to 27 planes that had recently arrived to replace the ones he’d accounted for a couple of weeks earlier.
Stirling and the SAS continued to rely on the LRDG as their ‘Libyan Taxi Service’ for the first six months of 1942, and he also looked to them for guidance in nurturing his embryonic SAS. “We passed on our knowledge to the SAS and they were very grateful to receive it,” recalled Jim Patch, who joined the LRDG in 1941. “David Stirling was a frequent visitor and he would chat and absorb things. He took advice, man to man, he didn’t just stick with the officers, he went round to the men, too.”
In the first six months of 1942, the SAS, thanks in no small measure to the LRDG, had destroyed 143 enemy aircraft. As Stirling noted:
“By the end of June, L Detachment had raided all the more important German and Italian aerodromes within 300 miles of the forward area at least once or twice. Methods of defence were beginning to improve and although the advantage still lay with L Detachment, the time had come to alter our own methods.”
For the rest of the war in North Africa, the SAS operated largely independently of the LRDG, using their own jeeps obtained in Cairo and their own navigators, now trained by the LRDG in the art of desert navigation. While the SAS conducted numerous hit-and-run raids against airfields and – following the El Alamein offensive – retreating Axis transport columns, the LRDG reverted to its original role of reconnaissance.
It was one that it accomplished with extraordinary diligence and endurance, often keeping enemy roads and positions under observation for days at a time, radioing back the vital intelligence to Cairo. With the desert war all but won, General Bernard Montgomery, commander of the Eighth Army, conveyed his thanks for the LRDG’s magnificent work in a letter to Prendergast dated 2 April 1943, praising “the excellent work done by your patrols” in reconnoitring the country into which his soldiers had advanced.
In 1984, David Stirling expressed his thanks to the LRDG in an address to an audience gathered for the opening of the refurbished SAS base in Hereford, named Stirling Lines, in honour of the regiment’s founder. “In those early days we came to owe the Long Range Desert Group a deep debt of gratitude,” said Stirling. “The LRDG were the supreme professionals of the desert and they were unstinting in their help.”
Long Range Desert Group
The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) was a unit of the British Army during World War
II. The unit was founded in Egypt, following the Italian declaration of war in June 1940, by Major Ralph A. Bagnold with the assistance of Captains Patrick Clayton and William Shaw, acting under the direction of then General Archibald Wavell.
The group specialised in mechanised reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and desert navigation.
The group was disbanded at the end of the war. The LRDG was nicknamed the "Mosquito Army" by Wavell. Special Air Service soldiers would refer to it as the "Libyan Desert Taxi Service".
The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), or as it was originally known as the Long Range Desert Patrol (LRDP), was formed in the summer of 1940. The object of the LRDG was long range ground reconnaissance deep in the Libyan Desert. These patrols would have to negotiate the uncharted LibyanSand Sea and Rebiana Sand Sea. Each patrol would have to be capable of travelling 2000 km over unmapped territory, taking their own food, water, fuel and be able to fight if required.
The original men were recruited from the hardy New Zealand Cavalry already stationed in the Middle East. For their transport the Ford 15 cwt and Chevrolet 30 cwt trucks were converted for their needs, with every inch being crammed with necessary equipment and last but not least they were fitted with armament. The weapons consisted of out of date or unwanted Lewis machine guns, Boys anti-tank rifles, 37mm Bofors and various small arms.
To understand the difficulty that these men faced, you will have to look at a map of Egypt and Libya.
Egyptis 386,095 sq miles, with an annual rainfall of 8 inches of water in the north and Nile Valley with virtually zero in the desert.
Libyais 679,180 sq miles, with 95% of this being desert or semi-desert, the average annual rainfall of 8 inches in the
coastal regions. While the British Mainland is only 86,180 sq miles.
With Libya split in half between Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east, the main patrolling area of the LRDG was Cyrenaica, an area about four times of England, Scotland and Wales, mostly desert.
To try to navigate this desert today is a feat in its self with all the 4x4 trucks, but to navigate it with 1930-40 trucks was a miracle. There is enough written about the LRDG so as not to dwell on the problems of navigation, getting bogged down in the sand and thousands of other problems that these men faced during the early years and we will jump a year.
By late summer 1941, the LRDG had changed and consisted of two Squadrons, A Sqn consisted of the R (NZ), T (NZ) & S
(Southern Rhodesian) Patrols, while B Sqn consisted of G (Guards) & Y(Yeomanry) Patrols. Also by this time most of Cyrenaica was mapped and forward bases set up.
During the Desert Campaign of 1940 to 1943 the LRDG invariably operated hundreds of miles behind enemy lines; although its chief function was reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, units of the LRDG (called "Patrols") did carry out some hard-hitting strike operations, the most famous one of which was Operation Caravan, an attack on the town of Barce and its associated airfield, which took place on the night of 13 September 1942.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was to state:
"The LRDG caused us more damage than any other unit of their size."
II. The unit was founded in Egypt, following the Italian declaration of war in June 1940, by Major Ralph A. Bagnold with the assistance of Captains Patrick Clayton and William Shaw, acting under the direction of then General Archibald Wavell.
The group specialised in mechanised reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and desert navigation.
The group was disbanded at the end of the war. The LRDG was nicknamed the "Mosquito Army" by Wavell. Special Air Service soldiers would refer to it as the "Libyan Desert Taxi Service".
The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), or as it was originally known as the Long Range Desert Patrol (LRDP), was formed in the summer of 1940. The object of the LRDG was long range ground reconnaissance deep in the Libyan Desert. These patrols would have to negotiate the uncharted LibyanSand Sea and Rebiana Sand Sea. Each patrol would have to be capable of travelling 2000 km over unmapped territory, taking their own food, water, fuel and be able to fight if required.
The original men were recruited from the hardy New Zealand Cavalry already stationed in the Middle East. For their transport the Ford 15 cwt and Chevrolet 30 cwt trucks were converted for their needs, with every inch being crammed with necessary equipment and last but not least they were fitted with armament. The weapons consisted of out of date or unwanted Lewis machine guns, Boys anti-tank rifles, 37mm Bofors and various small arms.
To understand the difficulty that these men faced, you will have to look at a map of Egypt and Libya.
Egyptis 386,095 sq miles, with an annual rainfall of 8 inches of water in the north and Nile Valley with virtually zero in the desert.
Libyais 679,180 sq miles, with 95% of this being desert or semi-desert, the average annual rainfall of 8 inches in the
coastal regions. While the British Mainland is only 86,180 sq miles.
With Libya split in half between Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east, the main patrolling area of the LRDG was Cyrenaica, an area about four times of England, Scotland and Wales, mostly desert.
To try to navigate this desert today is a feat in its self with all the 4x4 trucks, but to navigate it with 1930-40 trucks was a miracle. There is enough written about the LRDG so as not to dwell on the problems of navigation, getting bogged down in the sand and thousands of other problems that these men faced during the early years and we will jump a year.
By late summer 1941, the LRDG had changed and consisted of two Squadrons, A Sqn consisted of the R (NZ), T (NZ) & S
(Southern Rhodesian) Patrols, while B Sqn consisted of G (Guards) & Y(Yeomanry) Patrols. Also by this time most of Cyrenaica was mapped and forward bases set up.
During the Desert Campaign of 1940 to 1943 the LRDG invariably operated hundreds of miles behind enemy lines; although its chief function was reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, units of the LRDG (called "Patrols") did carry out some hard-hitting strike operations, the most famous one of which was Operation Caravan, an attack on the town of Barce and its associated airfield, which took place on the night of 13 September 1942.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was to state:
"The LRDG caused us more damage than any other unit of their size."
Formation and equipment
During World War I reconnaissance and light-strike forces known as Light Car Patrols (LCP) operated against Senussi and later Turkish forces across Egypt and Palestine. These units, manned by New Zealand, Australian and British personnel, used converted Ford Model T cars armed with Lewis machine guns.
Between the wars MajorRalph Bagnold, an officer in the Royal Signals Corps pioneered long range travel and navigation techniques. Travelling extensively throughout Egypt and Libya in Ford Model A trucks, he succeeded in negotiating areas hitherto thought impassable. Among other things, Bagnold had made major improvements on the Sun Compass, the new version of which was patented by him and later used by the LRDG. Bagnold's experiences with Italian military forces persuaded him that they posed a major threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal in the event of war being declared. With this in mind, in 1939, Major Bagnold
proposed setting up a unit similar to the Light Car Patrols which could be used to spy on the Italians. His ideas were roundly dismissed until, through a set of fortunate circumstances, he was able to get his ideas to then General Archibald Wavell
who, by the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940, was in command of the British and Commonwealth armies in the Middle East. Wavell immediately saw the merits of Bagnold's scheme and Bagnold was given a free hand to look for volunteers amongst the forces which were available.
The unit, initially known as the Long Range Patrol, was founded on 3 July 1940. From the start it was thought that
Australians and New Zealanders, with their mostly rural backgrounds, would be more self-reliant than their more urbanised British counterparts. However, General Blamey was restricted by a directive issued by the Australian government that Australian personnel were to fight together as the AIF and were not to be parcelled out to non-Australian formations. The New
Zealanders were approached next and 150 New Zealand volunteers were then selected with the permission of General
Freyberg, the New Zealand commanding general in the Middle East theatre. Bagnold had reasoned that the New Zealanders, being mostly farmers, would be more adept at using and maintaining machinery.
Later additions to the group included British and Rhodesian units. An Indian Long Range Squadron was also set up, which operated as a semi-autonomous formation within the LRDG. [3] Several South Africans also served in the LRDG.
During the Desert Campaign, from 1940 to 1943, the LRDG went through several phases of organisation, although in the first year or so it was broadly organised into Patrols of two officers, 28 "other ranks" and four reinforcements manning 11 vehicles. Later it was found that it would be more flexible to split each Patrol into two Half Patrols each of which comprised one officer and 15 to 20 other ranks in five or six vehicles.
Each vehicle was manned by a vehicle commander, a driver, who also specialised in maintenance and loading of the vehicle, and a gunner, who was responsible for maintaining all weapons and associated equipment. W/T trucks had a navigator/wireless operator added to the crew in place of one of the gunners.
The LRDG gained a well earned reputation as the experts in navigation in the Middle East. The LRDG was also frequently called upon to transport personnel of the SAS, the Free French, Popski's Private Army and other commando units, as well as British and Arab undercover agents. Allied prisoners of war were sometimes rescued as well as downed aircrew, and enemy personnel were often captured by LRDG patrols.
During World War I reconnaissance and light-strike forces known as Light Car Patrols (LCP) operated against Senussi and later Turkish forces across Egypt and Palestine. These units, manned by New Zealand, Australian and British personnel, used converted Ford Model T cars armed with Lewis machine guns.
Between the wars MajorRalph Bagnold, an officer in the Royal Signals Corps pioneered long range travel and navigation techniques. Travelling extensively throughout Egypt and Libya in Ford Model A trucks, he succeeded in negotiating areas hitherto thought impassable. Among other things, Bagnold had made major improvements on the Sun Compass, the new version of which was patented by him and later used by the LRDG. Bagnold's experiences with Italian military forces persuaded him that they posed a major threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal in the event of war being declared. With this in mind, in 1939, Major Bagnold
proposed setting up a unit similar to the Light Car Patrols which could be used to spy on the Italians. His ideas were roundly dismissed until, through a set of fortunate circumstances, he was able to get his ideas to then General Archibald Wavell
who, by the entry of Italy into the war in June 1940, was in command of the British and Commonwealth armies in the Middle East. Wavell immediately saw the merits of Bagnold's scheme and Bagnold was given a free hand to look for volunteers amongst the forces which were available.
The unit, initially known as the Long Range Patrol, was founded on 3 July 1940. From the start it was thought that
Australians and New Zealanders, with their mostly rural backgrounds, would be more self-reliant than their more urbanised British counterparts. However, General Blamey was restricted by a directive issued by the Australian government that Australian personnel were to fight together as the AIF and were not to be parcelled out to non-Australian formations. The New
Zealanders were approached next and 150 New Zealand volunteers were then selected with the permission of General
Freyberg, the New Zealand commanding general in the Middle East theatre. Bagnold had reasoned that the New Zealanders, being mostly farmers, would be more adept at using and maintaining machinery.
Later additions to the group included British and Rhodesian units. An Indian Long Range Squadron was also set up, which operated as a semi-autonomous formation within the LRDG. [3] Several South Africans also served in the LRDG.
During the Desert Campaign, from 1940 to 1943, the LRDG went through several phases of organisation, although in the first year or so it was broadly organised into Patrols of two officers, 28 "other ranks" and four reinforcements manning 11 vehicles. Later it was found that it would be more flexible to split each Patrol into two Half Patrols each of which comprised one officer and 15 to 20 other ranks in five or six vehicles.
Each vehicle was manned by a vehicle commander, a driver, who also specialised in maintenance and loading of the vehicle, and a gunner, who was responsible for maintaining all weapons and associated equipment. W/T trucks had a navigator/wireless operator added to the crew in place of one of the gunners.
The LRDG gained a well earned reputation as the experts in navigation in the Middle East. The LRDG was also frequently called upon to transport personnel of the SAS, the Free French, Popski's Private Army and other commando units, as well as British and Arab undercover agents. Allied prisoners of war were sometimes rescued as well as downed aircrew, and enemy personnel were often captured by LRDG patrols.
Chevrolet WB
One of two 30 cwt Chevrolet WBs used during the first LRP incursion into Libya in August 1940. This vehicle is carrying a Lewis machine gun.
Initially the LRDG used a combination of ex-civilian 30
cwt Chevrolet WBs and 15 cwt Ford 01 V8 "pilot cars"; the latter were used by Patrol commanders to scout the
terrain ahead of the main unit. From about mid-1941 the 30 cwt Chevrolets were supplemented and gradually replaced by Ford F30 30 cwt 4x4 trucks. Although these vehicles, with their four wheel drive, were good at crossing rough terrain their heavy fuel consumption was a big disadvantage;
another problem was that the engine was mounted partly within the cab - this meant that conditions for the driver and passenger became very hot and uncomfortable. To aid cooling the radiator grilles and bonnets of the F30s were usually removed. The Ford 01s were also replaced by 15 cwt Chevrolet 1131X3 4x2, "Indian Pattern".
Converting LRDG trucks for desert use entailed removing the cab roof and doors, replacing the windscreen with "aero"
screens and fitting radiator condensers, Bagnold sun compasses, steel sand channels and heavy canvas sand mats, [8] plus weapons mountings. A number of trucks were also equipped with "aero" compasses of the type used by RAF aircraft and others had magnetic compasses in addition to the standard Bagnold sun-compass. Special wide-tread, low-pressure desert tires, which could
be identified by their "diamond" or square tread pattern, were fitted. Spare wheels were often carried on quick release mountings on the sides of the vehicles, with additional spare wheels being loaded in the cargo tray. Because the trucks carried up to two and a half tons of equipment and supplies at the start of each mission the suspension springs were reinforced with extra leaves.
Initially the LRDG used a combination of ex-civilian 30
cwt Chevrolet WBs and 15 cwt Ford 01 V8 "pilot cars"; the latter were used by Patrol commanders to scout the
terrain ahead of the main unit. From about mid-1941 the 30 cwt Chevrolets were supplemented and gradually replaced by Ford F30 30 cwt 4x4 trucks. Although these vehicles, with their four wheel drive, were good at crossing rough terrain their heavy fuel consumption was a big disadvantage;
another problem was that the engine was mounted partly within the cab - this meant that conditions for the driver and passenger became very hot and uncomfortable. To aid cooling the radiator grilles and bonnets of the F30s were usually removed. The Ford 01s were also replaced by 15 cwt Chevrolet 1131X3 4x2, "Indian Pattern".
Converting LRDG trucks for desert use entailed removing the cab roof and doors, replacing the windscreen with "aero"
screens and fitting radiator condensers, Bagnold sun compasses, steel sand channels and heavy canvas sand mats, [8] plus weapons mountings. A number of trucks were also equipped with "aero" compasses of the type used by RAF aircraft and others had magnetic compasses in addition to the standard Bagnold sun-compass. Special wide-tread, low-pressure desert tires, which could
be identified by their "diamond" or square tread pattern, were fitted. Spare wheels were often carried on quick release mountings on the sides of the vehicles, with additional spare wheels being loaded in the cargo tray. Because the trucks carried up to two and a half tons of equipment and supplies at the start of each mission the suspension springs were reinforced with extra leaves.
Stuck!
"R6" of R 1 Patrol has been caught, fortunately not too deeply, in soft sand and is being prepared for "unditching". The sand mats have been laid in front of the front wheels and a sand channel is about to be pushed under the right rear wheel.
In March 1942 the LRDG began to receive the first of 200
Canadian-built Chevrolet 1533X2 4x2 30 cwt trucks,
with a steel Gotfredson 4BI "ammunition body". Each of the Gotfredson bodies had lockers incorporated into the front face and forward of the rear wheels. The
body sides were made higher by fitting wooden "greedy boards"; the posts onto which the "greedy boards" were mounted also doubled as weapons mountings capable
of carrying a light machine gun. A reinforced post mounting for the rear machine gun was fitted to the rear half of the tray. Another weapons post was fitted to the front left door pillar. Brackets for carrying Lee-Enfield rifles were usually fitted to the rear door posts on both sides of the open cab.
The Bagnold sun compass was fitted to the centre of the front bulkhead, above the instrument panel. Most of these vehicles also carried racks of three two-gallon oil cans on the rear of each running board.
In the case of W/T trucks a special compartment was built into the forward right side of the Gotfredson body in which was fitted an Army No. 11 wireless transmitter and a Philips model 635 receiver; wooden masts for the "Windom" aerial array were fitted on brackets to the "greedy board" above the radio installation and an insulated aerial mount was fitted to the front of the body. The
compartment was covered by a bottom-hinged flap which doubled as a table when lowered; in addition the No 11 wireless was covered by a door which slid backwards along the side of the body.
In March 1942 the LRDG began to receive the first of 200
Canadian-built Chevrolet 1533X2 4x2 30 cwt trucks,
with a steel Gotfredson 4BI "ammunition body". Each of the Gotfredson bodies had lockers incorporated into the front face and forward of the rear wheels. The
body sides were made higher by fitting wooden "greedy boards"; the posts onto which the "greedy boards" were mounted also doubled as weapons mountings capable
of carrying a light machine gun. A reinforced post mounting for the rear machine gun was fitted to the rear half of the tray. Another weapons post was fitted to the front left door pillar. Brackets for carrying Lee-Enfield rifles were usually fitted to the rear door posts on both sides of the open cab.
The Bagnold sun compass was fitted to the centre of the front bulkhead, above the instrument panel. Most of these vehicles also carried racks of three two-gallon oil cans on the rear of each running board.
In the case of W/T trucks a special compartment was built into the forward right side of the Gotfredson body in which was fitted an Army No. 11 wireless transmitter and a Philips model 635 receiver; wooden masts for the "Windom" aerial array were fitted on brackets to the "greedy board" above the radio installation and an insulated aerial mount was fitted to the front of the body. The
compartment was covered by a bottom-hinged flap which doubled as a table when lowered; in addition the No 11 wireless was covered by a door which slid backwards along the side of the body.
Chevrolet T10
A posed photo of a 1533x2 Chevrolet "T10" of T 1 Patrol. Trooper Euan Hay is manning the Lewis; behind the steering wheel is Driver Gerry Gerrard; Corporal Merlyn H Craw MM
aims a captured Breda-Safat machine gun. The "Topees" were never used on active patrols by the LRDG. This provides a good illustration of how these trucks were modified and
equipped.
Although these vehicles were two wheel drive an extra low ratio gearbox and powerful straight-six engine meant they
could deal with the terrain types traversed by the LRDG. On flat, firm surfaces
they could easily reach and cruise at 100 km/h.
More importantly, they consumed petrol at half the rate of the F30s which was a vital factor in allowing the unit to carry out successful long-range missions.
aims a captured Breda-Safat machine gun. The "Topees" were never used on active patrols by the LRDG. This provides a good illustration of how these trucks were modified and
equipped.
Although these vehicles were two wheel drive an extra low ratio gearbox and powerful straight-six engine meant they
could deal with the terrain types traversed by the LRDG. On flat, firm surfaces
they could easily reach and cruise at 100 km/h.
More importantly, they consumed petrol at half the rate of the F30s which was a vital factor in allowing the unit to carry out successful long-range missions.
LRDG Jeep
An LRDG Jeep. Sand tyres are fitted rather than the more familiar chevron pattern military types.
From early 1942 the Chevrolet 1131 "pilot cars" were
progressively replaced by Willys Jeeps as supplies became available. For several months the Special Air Service took priority over the LRDG when Jeeps were being allocated, the irony being that in several of its early missions the SAS relied on the LRDG for transport.
The LRDG took particular delight in salvaging abandoned SAS Jeeps and restoring them back to running order before handing them over to their own patrol leaders.
LRDG Jeeps were typically armed with either the Vickers K or .303 Browning machine gun in either a single or twinned mountings.
From early 1943 Jeeps progressively became the main patrol vehicle as the Chevrolets and remaining Ford trucks wore out. By May, when the Desert Campaign was wound up, the standard establishment had become six Jeeps per half Patrol.
It should be noted that the LRDG maintained its vehicles to a very high standard and boasted well equipped workshop facilities at its base (called "The Citadel") in Cairo and at its forward bases at Kufra and later Jalo.
Each patrol went out with a "fitters" truck which was a standard patrol vehicle equipped with tools and spare parts (extra springs, fanbelts, carburettors, clutches, spark plugs etc) sufficient to allow running repairs in the field. This truck always travelled at the rear of the column. The fitter who was part of the crew, was a fully qualified motor mechanic. The drivers of each vehicle were also able to carry out mechanical repairs. Many vehicles were salvaged through some ingenious improvisation; on one mission a truck cracked its differential housing and crushed the cover plate on a rock, completely losing the oil. Towing the vehicle the 1,600 km back to base was impossible. The solution reached was to seal the cracked housing with chewing-gum and to pack the differential with whole bananas. Once the cover plate was hammered back to shape and bolted in place, and a trial run carried out, the 1,600 km journey was completed without any problems.
From early 1942 the Chevrolet 1131 "pilot cars" were
progressively replaced by Willys Jeeps as supplies became available. For several months the Special Air Service took priority over the LRDG when Jeeps were being allocated, the irony being that in several of its early missions the SAS relied on the LRDG for transport.
The LRDG took particular delight in salvaging abandoned SAS Jeeps and restoring them back to running order before handing them over to their own patrol leaders.
LRDG Jeeps were typically armed with either the Vickers K or .303 Browning machine gun in either a single or twinned mountings.
From early 1943 Jeeps progressively became the main patrol vehicle as the Chevrolets and remaining Ford trucks wore out. By May, when the Desert Campaign was wound up, the standard establishment had become six Jeeps per half Patrol.
It should be noted that the LRDG maintained its vehicles to a very high standard and boasted well equipped workshop facilities at its base (called "The Citadel") in Cairo and at its forward bases at Kufra and later Jalo.
Each patrol went out with a "fitters" truck which was a standard patrol vehicle equipped with tools and spare parts (extra springs, fanbelts, carburettors, clutches, spark plugs etc) sufficient to allow running repairs in the field. This truck always travelled at the rear of the column. The fitter who was part of the crew, was a fully qualified motor mechanic. The drivers of each vehicle were also able to carry out mechanical repairs. Many vehicles were salvaged through some ingenious improvisation; on one mission a truck cracked its differential housing and crushed the cover plate on a rock, completely losing the oil. Towing the vehicle the 1,600 km back to base was impossible. The solution reached was to seal the cracked housing with chewing-gum and to pack the differential with whole bananas. Once the cover plate was hammered back to shape and bolted in place, and a trial run carried out, the 1,600 km journey was completed without any problems.
The Long Range Desert Group played a major part in the Allies victory in North Africa in World War Two. The Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) became the forward eyes and ears of the Allies and together with the Special AirService played a secretive but vital role for the Allies.
The LRDG had two particular roles in the war in North Africa. They were to get behind enemy lines and act as scouts and gather intelligence to feed back to British military headquarters. To begin with, Bagnold’s new unit was known as the Long Range
Patrol Group.
After getting the agreement of General Wavell to create such a unit, Bagnold was given 150 New Zealand volunteers, most of whom had a farming background. Bagnold believed that they would be more adept at maintaining vehicles in a difficult environment
should mechanical problems occur.
The LRDG had three main patrols of forty men each. Each patrol was equipped with ten Lewis machine guns, four Boyes anti-tank rifles, anti-aircraft guns, Bren guns and Thompson sub-machine guns. Communication with base was maintained with the use
of wireless sets. Their vehicle of choice was a Chevrolet 30-cwt truck. The first batch of these vehicles was obtained from the Egyptian Army or bought in Cairo. Each vehicle commander was allowed to modify his vehicle as he saw fit. The normal range for the Chevrolet was 1,100 miles and it could carry three weeks supply of food and water. In many senses it was the perfect desert
vehicle.
On September 13th, 1940, the LRDG set up its first base at the Siwa Oasis. To get to this base, the LRDG had to drive about 160 miles across the Egyptian Sand Seas. Just two days later, the LRDG had its first experience of combat when a patrol led by Captain Mitford attacked an Italian petrol dump and emergency landing fields along the Palificata. Another patrol led by Captain Clayton crossed into French held Chad and persuaded the French forces there to join the Free French Forces. The two patrols met at Gilf Kebir, where they could re-supply, and travelled back to Cairo. By the time they returned, both patrols had covered about 4000 miles and had achieved a great deal.
Buoyed by such success, the War Office agreed that the LRDG could double in size to 300 men. The unit was officially now called the Long Range Desert Group (from Long Range Patrol Group) and Bagnold was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Volunteers were heavily vetted for such difficult work, but Bagnold found the extra 150 men he wanted. They came from the British, Indian and Rhodesian armies. Their primary targets were enemy held oases. The attackers went in quickly and disappeared just as quickly. Evidence points to the fact that the Italian commanders in North Africa were bemused by what happened to them and even
Bagnold recognised that “the Italian army was halted for months”.
The LRDG returned to Chad and, combining with the Free French there, fought the Italian in the region of the Murzuk Oasis. They also succeeded in capturing Kufra, which in 1941 became the headquarters for the LRDG. Bagnold later wrote that the temperature
frequently exceeded 50C, which, he claimed, his men found tolerable as it was dry heat. His main bone of contention was not being able to eat properly during sandstorms, which lasted for several days. Because of the hostility of the environment, few other Allied units got to the Kufra region. To all intents, the LRDG commanders there were de facto full commanders of an area the size of
northern Europe.
In July 1941, the LRDG got a new commander – Guy Prendergast. Bagnold, promoted to Colonel, returned to Cairo.
The LRDG had two particular roles in the war in North Africa. They were to get behind enemy lines and act as scouts and gather intelligence to feed back to British military headquarters. To begin with, Bagnold’s new unit was known as the Long Range
Patrol Group.
After getting the agreement of General Wavell to create such a unit, Bagnold was given 150 New Zealand volunteers, most of whom had a farming background. Bagnold believed that they would be more adept at maintaining vehicles in a difficult environment
should mechanical problems occur.
The LRDG had three main patrols of forty men each. Each patrol was equipped with ten Lewis machine guns, four Boyes anti-tank rifles, anti-aircraft guns, Bren guns and Thompson sub-machine guns. Communication with base was maintained with the use
of wireless sets. Their vehicle of choice was a Chevrolet 30-cwt truck. The first batch of these vehicles was obtained from the Egyptian Army or bought in Cairo. Each vehicle commander was allowed to modify his vehicle as he saw fit. The normal range for the Chevrolet was 1,100 miles and it could carry three weeks supply of food and water. In many senses it was the perfect desert
vehicle.
On September 13th, 1940, the LRDG set up its first base at the Siwa Oasis. To get to this base, the LRDG had to drive about 160 miles across the Egyptian Sand Seas. Just two days later, the LRDG had its first experience of combat when a patrol led by Captain Mitford attacked an Italian petrol dump and emergency landing fields along the Palificata. Another patrol led by Captain Clayton crossed into French held Chad and persuaded the French forces there to join the Free French Forces. The two patrols met at Gilf Kebir, where they could re-supply, and travelled back to Cairo. By the time they returned, both patrols had covered about 4000 miles and had achieved a great deal.
Buoyed by such success, the War Office agreed that the LRDG could double in size to 300 men. The unit was officially now called the Long Range Desert Group (from Long Range Patrol Group) and Bagnold was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel. Volunteers were heavily vetted for such difficult work, but Bagnold found the extra 150 men he wanted. They came from the British, Indian and Rhodesian armies. Their primary targets were enemy held oases. The attackers went in quickly and disappeared just as quickly. Evidence points to the fact that the Italian commanders in North Africa were bemused by what happened to them and even
Bagnold recognised that “the Italian army was halted for months”.
The LRDG returned to Chad and, combining with the Free French there, fought the Italian in the region of the Murzuk Oasis. They also succeeded in capturing Kufra, which in 1941 became the headquarters for the LRDG. Bagnold later wrote that the temperature
frequently exceeded 50C, which, he claimed, his men found tolerable as it was dry heat. His main bone of contention was not being able to eat properly during sandstorms, which lasted for several days. Because of the hostility of the environment, few other Allied units got to the Kufra region. To all intents, the LRDG commanders there were de facto full commanders of an area the size of
northern Europe.
In July 1941, the LRDG got a new commander – Guy Prendergast. Bagnold, promoted to Colonel, returned to Cairo.
Overview
On September 13th, 1940, a quarter of a million Italian troops under Marshal Rodolfo Graziani crossed the Libyan-Egyptian border and started an
attack on the British troops in Egypt. Their objective: to push through the weak British
defences and reach the Suez Canal, thus threatening one of the Empire's most vital links with its overseas colonies.
The outcome of the war might well have been different had the Italian troops succeeded in their campaign - however, just as the attack began, Graziani began receiving disturbing news of
attacks on his supply chains: depots were raided, airfields burned to the ground, convoys attacked and captured, all well behind the frontline and from a direction he had thought to be completely safe - his southern flank, bordered by a sand sea thought to be impassible for vehicles and troops.
The Italian offense halted, Graziani being uncertain how to deal with these unsuspected attacks that seemed to come out of nowhere, and the resulting break gave the British defenders all the time they needed to move in reinforcements and mount
a counterattack.
Unknown to Graziani, these raids were not carried out by large troop contingents but by a small group of desert experts formed only six weeks before - the Long Range Desert Group, at the time consisting of no more than a couple dozen men and a handful of re-fitted civilian trucks. This bold movement that was to tip the scales in the Allies' favor in one of the most decisive moments of the war was made possible by the vision of two men - General Sir Archibald Wavell, head of the British Middle East troops, who had masterminded this effective bluff, and Major Ralph Bagnold, a World War 1 Veteran who had spent the interwar years as a desert explorer and had a knowledge of the Libyan desert unmatched in his time.
As the Italian offense drew near, Bagnold had quickly contacted his pre-war explorer buddies and -on Wavell's command- started to assemble a unit that could quickly move through desert terrain and strike at the enemy where he least expected it, using lightly armed and completely unarmored vehicles and operating completely self-sufficient, patrols being able to move through the
desert for at least two weeks before resupplying.
During the course of the African Campaign, the unit conducted various raids on Axis targets far behind enemy lines, thus constantly
threatening the Axis' interior lines of communication and aggravating Rommel's already precarious supply situation. Of equally great importance was LRDG's intelligence work - patrols could supply HQ with detailed information on number, speed and direction of enemy troop movement, giving Allied operations a tactical edge that considerably helped fasten the defeat of Rommel's Afrika Korps.
When in the battle of Alam Halfa Rommel's deputy, Wilhelm von Thoma, was captured, he was surprised to hear that
Montgomery was better informed on German troop strengths and movements than he himself - information Montgomery had largely obtained from LRDG patrols.
Just as the LRDG had won the day in the beginning of the African war, they also triggered the end of the campaign: in 1943, when General Freyberg attacked Rommel's last stand at Mareth, he moved his troops through "impassable" terrain to attack the Germans' weak southern flank, using a route an LRDG patrol had scouted out for him.
attack on the British troops in Egypt. Their objective: to push through the weak British
defences and reach the Suez Canal, thus threatening one of the Empire's most vital links with its overseas colonies.
The outcome of the war might well have been different had the Italian troops succeeded in their campaign - however, just as the attack began, Graziani began receiving disturbing news of
attacks on his supply chains: depots were raided, airfields burned to the ground, convoys attacked and captured, all well behind the frontline and from a direction he had thought to be completely safe - his southern flank, bordered by a sand sea thought to be impassible for vehicles and troops.
The Italian offense halted, Graziani being uncertain how to deal with these unsuspected attacks that seemed to come out of nowhere, and the resulting break gave the British defenders all the time they needed to move in reinforcements and mount
a counterattack.
Unknown to Graziani, these raids were not carried out by large troop contingents but by a small group of desert experts formed only six weeks before - the Long Range Desert Group, at the time consisting of no more than a couple dozen men and a handful of re-fitted civilian trucks. This bold movement that was to tip the scales in the Allies' favor in one of the most decisive moments of the war was made possible by the vision of two men - General Sir Archibald Wavell, head of the British Middle East troops, who had masterminded this effective bluff, and Major Ralph Bagnold, a World War 1 Veteran who had spent the interwar years as a desert explorer and had a knowledge of the Libyan desert unmatched in his time.
As the Italian offense drew near, Bagnold had quickly contacted his pre-war explorer buddies and -on Wavell's command- started to assemble a unit that could quickly move through desert terrain and strike at the enemy where he least expected it, using lightly armed and completely unarmored vehicles and operating completely self-sufficient, patrols being able to move through the
desert for at least two weeks before resupplying.
During the course of the African Campaign, the unit conducted various raids on Axis targets far behind enemy lines, thus constantly
threatening the Axis' interior lines of communication and aggravating Rommel's already precarious supply situation. Of equally great importance was LRDG's intelligence work - patrols could supply HQ with detailed information on number, speed and direction of enemy troop movement, giving Allied operations a tactical edge that considerably helped fasten the defeat of Rommel's Afrika Korps.
When in the battle of Alam Halfa Rommel's deputy, Wilhelm von Thoma, was captured, he was surprised to hear that
Montgomery was better informed on German troop strengths and movements than he himself - information Montgomery had largely obtained from LRDG patrols.
Just as the LRDG had won the day in the beginning of the African war, they also triggered the end of the campaign: in 1943, when General Freyberg attacked Rommel's last stand at Mareth, he moved his troops through "impassable" terrain to attack the Germans' weak southern flank, using a route an LRDG patrol had scouted out for him.
Engine maintenance in the desert
Capt. Patrick Clayton Leader of the first LRPU patrol
The Coming Desert War.
At the outset of WWII the British were in Egypt and the Suez Canal, which acted as a crucial link to much of the British Empire, and was of the utmost strategic importance. It was also seen as
important to Italy and Germany.
With the occupation of Libya by now Fascist Italy, the threat to the Empire was enormous.
Fortunately, for Britain, Ralph Bagnold and other familiar names to the LRDG (Pat Clayton, Bill Kennedy Shaw, Guy Prendergast, to name a few) had been avid desert explorers between the
wars and had spent numerous hours of their free time and personal money building on the methods learned by the LCP in getting around the desert. Many of the lessons learned in this peace time pass-time would be directly applied to the mission of the LRDG.
Among other things, Bagnold had made major improvements on
the Sun Compass, which with these improvements, was patented by him, and with the aid of the Royal Geographic Society had managed to actually cross the Great Sand Sea on several occasions using Ford Model A trucks.
A feat considered impossible by just about every desert explorer!
At the outset of WWII the British were in Egypt and the Suez Canal, which acted as a crucial link to much of the British Empire, and was of the utmost strategic importance. It was also seen as
important to Italy and Germany.
With the occupation of Libya by now Fascist Italy, the threat to the Empire was enormous.
Fortunately, for Britain, Ralph Bagnold and other familiar names to the LRDG (Pat Clayton, Bill Kennedy Shaw, Guy Prendergast, to name a few) had been avid desert explorers between the
wars and had spent numerous hours of their free time and personal money building on the methods learned by the LCP in getting around the desert. Many of the lessons learned in this peace time pass-time would be directly applied to the mission of the LRDG.
Among other things, Bagnold had made major improvements on
the Sun Compass, which with these improvements, was patented by him, and with the aid of the Royal Geographic Society had managed to actually cross the Great Sand Sea on several occasions using Ford Model A trucks.
A feat considered impossible by just about every desert explorer!
Bagnold was aware of the dangers posed by the Italians in Libya. During one expedition, he ran into a boastful lieutenant of the Auto Saharan Company near the Kufra. The Auto saharan company and Bagnold's party spent a few days together and Bagnold consider the Italians polite, even gracious host. But he took note when the leader of the company boasted of how easy it would be for his company to make a raid across Egypt and blow up dams along the Nile and cut lines of communication and in general cripple the British Army in Egypt. Bagnold did not consider the comment boastful pride but a truthful account of the capabilities of the Auto Saharan.
Before the outbreak of the war in 1939 it was proposed that the British Army form a long range patrolling unit to spy on its neighbors to the west. His proposal was roundly dismissed as being diplomatically unsound as well as physically impossible. Most of the British senior staff felt it was impossible to operate motor vehicles through the uncharted desert. They all seemed to feel their was no need or no feasible way to accurately chart the desert. Furthermore it was felt that any long range reconnaissance could be accomplished with aircraft.
The War Begins and the birth of the LRPs.
As luck would have it, Bagnold had retired as a major after 20 years of service shortly before the war began. He was living in England but was recalled to duty. As one can suspect, because of his knowledge of the desert, the British Army decided to post him in Kenya! Fortunately for the British, his ship collided with another vessel in the Suez Canal and he wound up in Alexandria, Egypt. By this time Field Marshall Archibald Wavell was in command of the Middle East. Wavell, who was aware of Bagnold's past desert explorations has Bagnold assigned to the 7th Armoured Division (Desert Rats). Bagnold did not pitch his idea for long range patrols right away. But in time he began to propose such plans with his immediate commander. While his immediate commander was keen on the idea higher commanders were not. Eventually however, Bagnold went around the chain of command and with some help got his proposal in Wavell's hands. The proposal was met with enthusiasm and a short deadline of six weeks to get the unit operational. Bagnold was transferred to Wavell's headquarters. The unit was called the "Long Range Patrols" or Long Range Patrol
Units.
Bagnold was given a free hand to call for volunteers and decided early on to look for more robust "colonial forces" that were coming into theater, assuming they would be more self reliant than British Units. His first choice was Australians, assuming the arid outback region would have made them acclimated to a region like the Sahara. Unfortunately the Australian Divisional commander did not want his men be led by a British Officer. The New Zealanders were approached next. Their commander, Lt. Gen Bernard Freyberg had won the Victory Cross in WWI and was a colleague of Wavell. Within a few days Bagnold had his volunteers and they were considered the best that the Division had to offer.
The initial patrol was led by Pat Clayton, one of Bagnold's friends. What they found was a demoralized army in no hurry to fight. The information proved accurate and was instrumental in the campaign that followed. Wavell realized he was in no immediate danger and informed London that 2RTR and 7RTR could take a longer safer passage to Egypt instead of being rushed through hostile waters.
A New Name and New Patrols.
With the success of the initial patrol and some following raiding missions, Wavell immediately authorized the doubling of size of the LRP and the unit took on its new name, the Long Range Desert Group, LRDG. Unfortunately the New Zealand division could
not spare more men and Bagnold actually had to give a few of the originals back to the division!
Bagnold was forced to look else where and that elsewhere was once again newly arriving divisions. Among those arriving were the Coldstream Guards and Scots Guards, two of Britain's finest division and numerous Yeomanry units. Yeomanry were mounted territorial or reserve units. Bagnold realized that the various backgrounds of the professional and the part time, and the colonial may not be a good mix so instead of integrated the new men into the New Zealand patrols he organized two new patrols "G" for Guards and "Y" for Yeomanry. "W" patrol was gone but the New Zealander still had "R" and "T" patrol. The letters coming from Maori words used on their vehicles. Later another patrol would be raised from the southern area of the colony of Rhodesia and this patrol would take the letter "S" for south.
The men were not drawn based on physical attributes as much as they were for their mental stability and stamina. Not only did the men of the LRDG have to cope with long stretches of loneliness, harsh weather conditions, and danger, but they had to be
intelligent.
Before the outbreak of the war in 1939 it was proposed that the British Army form a long range patrolling unit to spy on its neighbors to the west. His proposal was roundly dismissed as being diplomatically unsound as well as physically impossible. Most of the British senior staff felt it was impossible to operate motor vehicles through the uncharted desert. They all seemed to feel their was no need or no feasible way to accurately chart the desert. Furthermore it was felt that any long range reconnaissance could be accomplished with aircraft.
The War Begins and the birth of the LRPs.
As luck would have it, Bagnold had retired as a major after 20 years of service shortly before the war began. He was living in England but was recalled to duty. As one can suspect, because of his knowledge of the desert, the British Army decided to post him in Kenya! Fortunately for the British, his ship collided with another vessel in the Suez Canal and he wound up in Alexandria, Egypt. By this time Field Marshall Archibald Wavell was in command of the Middle East. Wavell, who was aware of Bagnold's past desert explorations has Bagnold assigned to the 7th Armoured Division (Desert Rats). Bagnold did not pitch his idea for long range patrols right away. But in time he began to propose such plans with his immediate commander. While his immediate commander was keen on the idea higher commanders were not. Eventually however, Bagnold went around the chain of command and with some help got his proposal in Wavell's hands. The proposal was met with enthusiasm and a short deadline of six weeks to get the unit operational. Bagnold was transferred to Wavell's headquarters. The unit was called the "Long Range Patrols" or Long Range Patrol
Units.
Bagnold was given a free hand to call for volunteers and decided early on to look for more robust "colonial forces" that were coming into theater, assuming they would be more self reliant than British Units. His first choice was Australians, assuming the arid outback region would have made them acclimated to a region like the Sahara. Unfortunately the Australian Divisional commander did not want his men be led by a British Officer. The New Zealanders were approached next. Their commander, Lt. Gen Bernard Freyberg had won the Victory Cross in WWI and was a colleague of Wavell. Within a few days Bagnold had his volunteers and they were considered the best that the Division had to offer.
The initial patrol was led by Pat Clayton, one of Bagnold's friends. What they found was a demoralized army in no hurry to fight. The information proved accurate and was instrumental in the campaign that followed. Wavell realized he was in no immediate danger and informed London that 2RTR and 7RTR could take a longer safer passage to Egypt instead of being rushed through hostile waters.
A New Name and New Patrols.
With the success of the initial patrol and some following raiding missions, Wavell immediately authorized the doubling of size of the LRP and the unit took on its new name, the Long Range Desert Group, LRDG. Unfortunately the New Zealand division could
not spare more men and Bagnold actually had to give a few of the originals back to the division!
Bagnold was forced to look else where and that elsewhere was once again newly arriving divisions. Among those arriving were the Coldstream Guards and Scots Guards, two of Britain's finest division and numerous Yeomanry units. Yeomanry were mounted territorial or reserve units. Bagnold realized that the various backgrounds of the professional and the part time, and the colonial may not be a good mix so instead of integrated the new men into the New Zealand patrols he organized two new patrols "G" for Guards and "Y" for Yeomanry. "W" patrol was gone but the New Zealander still had "R" and "T" patrol. The letters coming from Maori words used on their vehicles. Later another patrol would be raised from the southern area of the colony of Rhodesia and this patrol would take the letter "S" for south.
The men were not drawn based on physical attributes as much as they were for their mental stability and stamina. Not only did the men of the LRDG have to cope with long stretches of loneliness, harsh weather conditions, and danger, but they had to be
intelligent.
Ford Truck
While physical toughness was a necessity, the troopers had to work well with others while at the same time be
self reliant. Each trooper needed to become a specialist in some aspect of the LRDG mission. Men were trained to be medics, navigators, fitters (mechanics), radio operators, etc. Besides being a specialist in one area they were cross trained in the event they had to take over for someone else. In short, you had to be competent in every aspect of the mission but be expert in one or two areas. All the members, officers and other ranks were expected to pull their
weight and be cross trained. All members were expected to know all the weapons employed by the LRDG.
Many of these attributes would live on in such organizations as the SAS and the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) but the
concept was novel in a modern army when it was introduced by the LRDG.
The LRDG also operated with other special forces such as the SAS, SIG (Special Interrogation Group), and the Commandos. They also operated with individuals from British Intelligence.
self reliant. Each trooper needed to become a specialist in some aspect of the LRDG mission. Men were trained to be medics, navigators, fitters (mechanics), radio operators, etc. Besides being a specialist in one area they were cross trained in the event they had to take over for someone else. In short, you had to be competent in every aspect of the mission but be expert in one or two areas. All the members, officers and other ranks were expected to pull their
weight and be cross trained. All members were expected to know all the weapons employed by the LRDG.
Many of these attributes would live on in such organizations as the SAS and the U.S. Army Special Forces (Green Berets) but the
concept was novel in a modern army when it was introduced by the LRDG.
The LRDG also operated with other special forces such as the SAS, SIG (Special Interrogation Group), and the Commandos. They also operated with individuals from British Intelligence.
SAS
David Stirling founded the Special Air Service in 1941. The work done by the Special Air Service (SAS) during World War Two was to revolutionise the way wars could be fought and many other special forces were to copy their tactics.
The philosophy of the SAS was to throw out standard military tactics – in one sense, the regiment had no formal tactics and improvisation was at the heart of their success. Some of the higher echelons of the military were less than enthusiastic
about what they called“private armies” and in its early stages, the SAS received little support from on high, especially from those senior officers who had been brought up in the traditional regiments of the British Army. Ironically, Stirling had joined one of these regiments at the start of the war – the Scots Guards.
David Stirling had got a taste for unconventional warfare when he volunteered for 8 Commando, which was more commonly known as ‘Layforce’ after its commander, Captain Robert Laycock. The lack of enthusiasm for Special Forces was shown when Layforce reached North Africa for its first taste of action, only to find that it was effectively disbanded before it had been able to prove itself.
Possibly angered by this treatment of Layforce, and to prove a point, Stirling set about setting up a unit that could fight behind enemy lines with the minimal of support but to devastating effect. Stirling believed that a small group of like-minded, highly trained and dedicated men could cause havoc to the Germans. He was joined in the venture by an Australian called Jock Lewes, an officer in the Welsh Guards.
While in early training, Stirling was injured in a parachute jump. He spent two months in hospital. For this energetic man, it must have been a difficult time as he was by his own standards, inactive. However, Stirling’s hospital stay may well have saved the SAS. Because he could do little physical activity in hospital, Stirling dedicated his time to actual planning – something that he had not done a great deal of before hand. By the end of his hospital stay, Stirling had a very clear idea of what he wanted the regiment to be able to do and the qualities of the men who would fight in it.
Using the unorthodox methods that are now associated with the SAS, Stirling did not go through the normal chain of command when putting forward his idea for the new regiment. He managed to get to see the Deputy Commander Middle East, General
Ritchie who presented Stirling’s plans to the British commander in North Africa, General Auchinlek. He authorised the use of the SAS almost immediately as he saw that potential it had in an environment like North Africa.
The first unit of the SAS was made up of 66 men from Layforce and it included seven officers. Its official title was L Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade. The title was an effort to confuse the Germans as to the size of the new unit – making it seem larger than it actually was.
The very first mission of the SAS was in November, 1941. The unit was to parachute behind the lines of the German Army in Gazala, North Africa, gather intelligence and harass the Germans where possible. The mission proved to be a failure. Stirling placed too
much faith in the capabilities of the men in the unit and gave the go-ahead for them to make a parachute jump in weather than simply did not warrant the risk – high winds and strong rain. Of the 66 men on the mission, only 22 made it back.
This was the proof that some needed to prove that ‘private armies’ were a waste and an unnecessary drain on military resources. However, the failure of the mission only spurred on Stirling and Lewes and they learned a great deal from this first outing. Though the SAS was on a steep learning curve, what was learned from this failed mission, was an apt memorial for those who did not
return from it.
One of the most obvious lessons Stirling learned was that a parachute drop could be a disaster. Therefore, he turned his attention to his men getting to their objective overland. In this, the SAS joined forces with the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) who were experts in movement behind enemy lines. They would drop off SAS troops at a designated point and then collect them from another set point. Most travelling was at night – though not exclusively. The two units worked very well together, with a
devastating impact on the Germans.
The major targets for the SAS were German and Italian air bases. Jock Lewes had many qualities, and inventing things was one of them. The Lewes Bomb was a bomb that was small enough to be carried in quantity by an individual but had a big enough
explosive charge to destroy a plane. Weighing in at just one pound, the bomb could ignite the fuel in a plane, thus destroying it. The most successful plane ‘buster’ was Paddy Mayne, who destroyed dozens of planes. The Axis powers in North Africa lost many planes as a result of SAS activity. The actions of the regiment had another impact which is more difficult to quantify. No-one knew where they would attack next and all German forces were on a constant state of alert with the accompanying drain on resources that this entailed. The Germans were literally chasing shadows in the night. The success of the SAS in North Africa provoked Hitler to produce the order (‘Kommandodobefehl’) that stated that any commandos or Special Forces men that were captured should be
shot and not afforded the protection of the Geneva Convention.
The Germans did what they could to stop attacks by the SAS. In response, the regiment changed its approach. They acquired their own transport, which were heavily armed with machine guns and equipped with plenty of supplies. Now they could stay behind enemy lines for days on end and it made it even more difficult for the Germans to predict what they might do next.
When working with the LRDG, the SAS would walk to their target after being dropped off by the LRDG. Now, equipped with Jeeps, they drove onto an airbase in complete surprise and created havoc. The ensuing panic meant that the SAS received relatively light casualties themselves. However, the defeat of the Germans after the Battle of El Alamein, meant that the SAS now had to find a new role for itself after its work in the desert. The regiment turned its attention to Europe.
In Western Europe, the SAS was in an entirely different terrain – one it had no experience of fighting in. However, the philosophy of the regiment stayed the same. In Western Europe, they set up bases behind enemy lines, gathered intelligence and, when possible, created havoc before slipping away. In France, four men units frequently worked with the Maquis, the French Resistance. Communication networks (rail lines, bridges etc) became favoured targets and intelligence gathering greatly assisted the D-Day landings in June 1944. Not everything ended in success though. Twenty four SAS men were captured by the Germans. They were tortured before being killed. In the final days of the war, one of the main tasks of the SAS was to hunt the men who committed this atrocity along with SS and Gestapo thugs.
Ironically, in the brave new post-war world, there did not seem to be a place for the SAS and it faded away only to be resurrected when its expertise was needed in the Far East against communist insurgents.
The Second World War in Europe ended on 8 May, by that time the SAS brigade had suffered 330 casualties, but had killed or
wounded 7,733 and captured 23,000 of their enemies. Later the same month 1st and 2nd SAS were sent to Norway to disarm the
300,000 German garrison and 5th SAS were in Denmark and Germany on counter intelligence operations. The brigade was dismantled soon afterwards, in September the Belgian 5th SAS were handed over to the reformed Belgian Army. On 1 October the 3rd and 4th French SAS were handed over to the French Army and on 8 October the British 1st and 2nd SAS regiments were
disbanded.
At the end of the war the British Government could see no need for a SAS type regiment, however in 1946 it was decided that
there was a need for a long term deep penetration commando or SAS unit. A new SAS regiment was raised as part of the Territorial
Army. The title chosen for the new regiment was 21st SAS Regiment (V) and the regiment chosen to take on the SAS mantle was the Artists Rifles. The new 21 SAS Regiment came into existence on 1 January 1947 and took over the Artists Rifles headquarters at Dukes Road, Euston.
In 1950 they raised a squadron to fight in the Korean War. After three months training, they were informed that the squadron would not, after all, be needed in Korea, and instead were sent to serve in the Malayan Emergency.
On arrival in Malaya they came under the command of the wartime SAS Brigade commander, Mike Calvert. They became B Squadron, Malayan Scouts (SAS), the other units were A Squadron, which had been formed from 100 local volunteers mostly ex Second World War SAS and Chindits and C Squadron formed from volunteers from Rhodesia. After three years service the Rhodesians returned home and were replaced by a New Zealand squadron.
A squadron was based at Ipoh while B and C squadrons were at Johore, during training they pioneered techniques of resupply
by helicopter and also set up the "Hearts and Minds" campaign to win over the locals with medical teams going from village to
village treating the sick. With the aid of Iban trackers from Boneo they became experts at surviving in the jungle. In 1951 the Malayan Scouts (SAS) had successfully recruited enough men to form a Regimental Headquarters, a headquarters squadron and four operational squadrons over 900 men. The regiment was tasked to seek, find, fix then destroy the terrorists and prevent their
infiltration into protected areas. Their tactics would be long range patrols, ambush and tracking the terrorists to their bases. They trained and acquired skills in tree jumping, this involved parachuting into the thick jungle canopy and letting your parachute catch on the branches. Brought to a halt the parachutist then cut himself free and lowered himself to the ground by rope. Using inflatable boats for river patrolling, jungle fighting techniques, psychological warfare and booby trapping terrorist supplies.
Calvert was invalided back to the United Kingdom in 1951 and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Sloane.
In February 1951 54 men from B Squadron carried out the first parachute drop in the campaign in Operation Helsby,
which was a major offensive in the River Perak-Belum valley, just south of the Thai border.
The need for a regular army SAS regiment had been recognised, the Malayan Scouts (SAS) were renamed 22 SAS Regiment and formally added to the army list in 1952.
Sea of Sand (released in the US as Desert Patrol) is a 1958 war film starring Michael Craig, John Gregson and Richard
Attenborough. It was directed by Guy Greenand shot entirely in and around Tripolitania, Libya. The film is set in North
Africa during World War II and tells the story of a patrol of the Long Range Desert Group(LRDG) that drove long distances behind enemy
lines to fight against Rommel's Afrika Korps.
The philosophy of the SAS was to throw out standard military tactics – in one sense, the regiment had no formal tactics and improvisation was at the heart of their success. Some of the higher echelons of the military were less than enthusiastic
about what they called“private armies” and in its early stages, the SAS received little support from on high, especially from those senior officers who had been brought up in the traditional regiments of the British Army. Ironically, Stirling had joined one of these regiments at the start of the war – the Scots Guards.
David Stirling had got a taste for unconventional warfare when he volunteered for 8 Commando, which was more commonly known as ‘Layforce’ after its commander, Captain Robert Laycock. The lack of enthusiasm for Special Forces was shown when Layforce reached North Africa for its first taste of action, only to find that it was effectively disbanded before it had been able to prove itself.
Possibly angered by this treatment of Layforce, and to prove a point, Stirling set about setting up a unit that could fight behind enemy lines with the minimal of support but to devastating effect. Stirling believed that a small group of like-minded, highly trained and dedicated men could cause havoc to the Germans. He was joined in the venture by an Australian called Jock Lewes, an officer in the Welsh Guards.
While in early training, Stirling was injured in a parachute jump. He spent two months in hospital. For this energetic man, it must have been a difficult time as he was by his own standards, inactive. However, Stirling’s hospital stay may well have saved the SAS. Because he could do little physical activity in hospital, Stirling dedicated his time to actual planning – something that he had not done a great deal of before hand. By the end of his hospital stay, Stirling had a very clear idea of what he wanted the regiment to be able to do and the qualities of the men who would fight in it.
Using the unorthodox methods that are now associated with the SAS, Stirling did not go through the normal chain of command when putting forward his idea for the new regiment. He managed to get to see the Deputy Commander Middle East, General
Ritchie who presented Stirling’s plans to the British commander in North Africa, General Auchinlek. He authorised the use of the SAS almost immediately as he saw that potential it had in an environment like North Africa.
The first unit of the SAS was made up of 66 men from Layforce and it included seven officers. Its official title was L Detachment, Special Air Service Brigade. The title was an effort to confuse the Germans as to the size of the new unit – making it seem larger than it actually was.
The very first mission of the SAS was in November, 1941. The unit was to parachute behind the lines of the German Army in Gazala, North Africa, gather intelligence and harass the Germans where possible. The mission proved to be a failure. Stirling placed too
much faith in the capabilities of the men in the unit and gave the go-ahead for them to make a parachute jump in weather than simply did not warrant the risk – high winds and strong rain. Of the 66 men on the mission, only 22 made it back.
This was the proof that some needed to prove that ‘private armies’ were a waste and an unnecessary drain on military resources. However, the failure of the mission only spurred on Stirling and Lewes and they learned a great deal from this first outing. Though the SAS was on a steep learning curve, what was learned from this failed mission, was an apt memorial for those who did not
return from it.
One of the most obvious lessons Stirling learned was that a parachute drop could be a disaster. Therefore, he turned his attention to his men getting to their objective overland. In this, the SAS joined forces with the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) who were experts in movement behind enemy lines. They would drop off SAS troops at a designated point and then collect them from another set point. Most travelling was at night – though not exclusively. The two units worked very well together, with a
devastating impact on the Germans.
The major targets for the SAS were German and Italian air bases. Jock Lewes had many qualities, and inventing things was one of them. The Lewes Bomb was a bomb that was small enough to be carried in quantity by an individual but had a big enough
explosive charge to destroy a plane. Weighing in at just one pound, the bomb could ignite the fuel in a plane, thus destroying it. The most successful plane ‘buster’ was Paddy Mayne, who destroyed dozens of planes. The Axis powers in North Africa lost many planes as a result of SAS activity. The actions of the regiment had another impact which is more difficult to quantify. No-one knew where they would attack next and all German forces were on a constant state of alert with the accompanying drain on resources that this entailed. The Germans were literally chasing shadows in the night. The success of the SAS in North Africa provoked Hitler to produce the order (‘Kommandodobefehl’) that stated that any commandos or Special Forces men that were captured should be
shot and not afforded the protection of the Geneva Convention.
The Germans did what they could to stop attacks by the SAS. In response, the regiment changed its approach. They acquired their own transport, which were heavily armed with machine guns and equipped with plenty of supplies. Now they could stay behind enemy lines for days on end and it made it even more difficult for the Germans to predict what they might do next.
When working with the LRDG, the SAS would walk to their target after being dropped off by the LRDG. Now, equipped with Jeeps, they drove onto an airbase in complete surprise and created havoc. The ensuing panic meant that the SAS received relatively light casualties themselves. However, the defeat of the Germans after the Battle of El Alamein, meant that the SAS now had to find a new role for itself after its work in the desert. The regiment turned its attention to Europe.
In Western Europe, the SAS was in an entirely different terrain – one it had no experience of fighting in. However, the philosophy of the regiment stayed the same. In Western Europe, they set up bases behind enemy lines, gathered intelligence and, when possible, created havoc before slipping away. In France, four men units frequently worked with the Maquis, the French Resistance. Communication networks (rail lines, bridges etc) became favoured targets and intelligence gathering greatly assisted the D-Day landings in June 1944. Not everything ended in success though. Twenty four SAS men were captured by the Germans. They were tortured before being killed. In the final days of the war, one of the main tasks of the SAS was to hunt the men who committed this atrocity along with SS and Gestapo thugs.
Ironically, in the brave new post-war world, there did not seem to be a place for the SAS and it faded away only to be resurrected when its expertise was needed in the Far East against communist insurgents.
The Second World War in Europe ended on 8 May, by that time the SAS brigade had suffered 330 casualties, but had killed or
wounded 7,733 and captured 23,000 of their enemies. Later the same month 1st and 2nd SAS were sent to Norway to disarm the
300,000 German garrison and 5th SAS were in Denmark and Germany on counter intelligence operations. The brigade was dismantled soon afterwards, in September the Belgian 5th SAS were handed over to the reformed Belgian Army. On 1 October the 3rd and 4th French SAS were handed over to the French Army and on 8 October the British 1st and 2nd SAS regiments were
disbanded.
At the end of the war the British Government could see no need for a SAS type regiment, however in 1946 it was decided that
there was a need for a long term deep penetration commando or SAS unit. A new SAS regiment was raised as part of the Territorial
Army. The title chosen for the new regiment was 21st SAS Regiment (V) and the regiment chosen to take on the SAS mantle was the Artists Rifles. The new 21 SAS Regiment came into existence on 1 January 1947 and took over the Artists Rifles headquarters at Dukes Road, Euston.
In 1950 they raised a squadron to fight in the Korean War. After three months training, they were informed that the squadron would not, after all, be needed in Korea, and instead were sent to serve in the Malayan Emergency.
On arrival in Malaya they came under the command of the wartime SAS Brigade commander, Mike Calvert. They became B Squadron, Malayan Scouts (SAS), the other units were A Squadron, which had been formed from 100 local volunteers mostly ex Second World War SAS and Chindits and C Squadron formed from volunteers from Rhodesia. After three years service the Rhodesians returned home and were replaced by a New Zealand squadron.
A squadron was based at Ipoh while B and C squadrons were at Johore, during training they pioneered techniques of resupply
by helicopter and also set up the "Hearts and Minds" campaign to win over the locals with medical teams going from village to
village treating the sick. With the aid of Iban trackers from Boneo they became experts at surviving in the jungle. In 1951 the Malayan Scouts (SAS) had successfully recruited enough men to form a Regimental Headquarters, a headquarters squadron and four operational squadrons over 900 men. The regiment was tasked to seek, find, fix then destroy the terrorists and prevent their
infiltration into protected areas. Their tactics would be long range patrols, ambush and tracking the terrorists to their bases. They trained and acquired skills in tree jumping, this involved parachuting into the thick jungle canopy and letting your parachute catch on the branches. Brought to a halt the parachutist then cut himself free and lowered himself to the ground by rope. Using inflatable boats for river patrolling, jungle fighting techniques, psychological warfare and booby trapping terrorist supplies.
Calvert was invalided back to the United Kingdom in 1951 and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Sloane.
In February 1951 54 men from B Squadron carried out the first parachute drop in the campaign in Operation Helsby,
which was a major offensive in the River Perak-Belum valley, just south of the Thai border.
The need for a regular army SAS regiment had been recognised, the Malayan Scouts (SAS) were renamed 22 SAS Regiment and formally added to the army list in 1952.
Sea of Sand (released in the US as Desert Patrol) is a 1958 war film starring Michael Craig, John Gregson and Richard
Attenborough. It was directed by Guy Greenand shot entirely in and around Tripolitania, Libya. The film is set in North
Africa during World War II and tells the story of a patrol of the Long Range Desert Group(LRDG) that drove long distances behind enemy
lines to fight against Rommel's Afrika Korps.
SAS January 18th 1943
Y Patrol at Siwa